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REASSESSING THE ROLE OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
REBUILDING NATIONAL COURTS
THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS
Elena Baylis*
Abstract: The international community has long debated its role in redressing grave atrocities like war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This Article suggests that this debate has focused too much on trials in
international and hybrid courts as the primary conduit for international
contributions to justice in post-conflict states. It proposes that the international community should look instead to national courts as the primary venue for such trials and to transnational networks as an effective
mechanism for international involvement. Key characteristics of this
model include: (1) reliance on transnational networks to convey international criminal law and international resources into national settings;
(2) hybrid international-national processes in which international actors play a supporting, rather than a controlling, role; and (3) integration of international support for atrocity trials into broader efforts to
rebuild national judicial systems.

Introduction
Ten years after the adoption of the International Criminal Court’s
Rome Statute,1 the role of international criminal law in post-conflict
justice is ripe for reassessment. Early claims that international criminal
* Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School;
B.A., University of Oregon. This Article has benefited from presentations at the Junior
International Law Scholars Conference at Yale Law School, the Law and Society Annual
Meeting at Humboldt University in Berlin, and a faculty workshop at the University of
Pittsburgh Law School. Thanks to Paul Berman, Mark Drumbl, Mark Janis, Chimène Keitner, Hari Osofsky, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Jane Stromseth, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, and David
Zaring for their comments, advice, and encouragement; to Lisl Brunner, Malin Delling,
Kate Drabecki, and Foreign and International Law Librarian Linda Tashbook for their
research; and to the University of Pittsburgh’s School of Law, Center for International
Legal Education, University Center for International Studies, and Central Research Development Fund for grants supporting my field research in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
1 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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courts would end impunity for atrocities have long been dismissed as
overblown.2 Indeed, as the ad hoc international criminal courts for
Yugoslavia and Rwanda work toward completion of their mandates, it
has become evident that their accomplishments have been both limited
and lopsided, with a decided tilt toward international approbation and
influence rather than on-the-ground domestic impact in the concerned
states.3
As these limits have become apparent, advocates of international
criminal law have sought to redefine its role in post-conflict justice, by
shifting focus from international trials as such to international courts’
influence upon national trials and domestic legal systems. Within the
United Nations, discussion of the completion strategies for the ad hoc
tribunals turns again and again to “legacy” and “outreach,” although
the prospects for a significant domestic role for these tribunals are
relatively remote at this late date.4 Hybrid tribunals with panels that
include both foreign and domestic judges have been introduced in
Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, and elsewhere, with “mixed” results.5 Now, even before the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has
held its first trial, some scholars have conceded that it cannot hope to
play its desired transformative role through its own trials; accordingly,
they have proposed that it should instead refocus its energies on interactions with hybrid and national tribunals.6
While these developments represent a fundamental challenge to
the raison d’être of international criminal tribunals, this is but the latest
turn in the longstanding debate over the role of international criminal
law and the appropriate balance between international and national
2 This conclusion has been reached by supporters and detractors alike. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National
Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 53, 53–54 (2008); Jack
Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 89 (2003);
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 3–4
(2005).
3 Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law?, 38 Geo. J. Int’l L. 251, 268–69, 276 (2007); Turner, supra note 2,
at 24–26.
4 Stromseth, supra note 3, at 269–79; Turner, supra note 2, at 28–29; Press Release,
U.N. General Assembly, Presidents of Tribunals for Rwanda, Former Yugoslavia Address
General Assembly, Ask for Continued Support as Completion Dates Approach, U.N. Doc.
GA/10636 (Oct. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Continued Support]; see also infra notes 21–43 and
accompanying text.
5 Stromseth, supra note 3, at 281; see also infra notes 55–78 and accompanying text.
6 See Burke-White, supra note 2, at 54; Turner, supra note 2, at 29; see also infra notes
55–78 and accompanying text.
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courts in addressing atrocities.7 As this debate has developed, the focus
of the discussion seems to have shifted from the core issue—how the
international community can best contribute to post-conflict justice in
affected states—to the question of the role of international courts. Indeed, the debate now seems to center particularly on whether and how
to preserve a central role for these international courts in which the
international community has invested so much hope.8 This shift is especially striking in light of the fact that one of the ICC’s core design
elements, complementarity, embedded in the very structure of the
court the principle of deference to national tribunals.
I suggest here that we should return to first principles and reassess
the role of international criminal law and the international community
from the ground up. Rather than considering post-conflict justice from
the perspective of international courts and asking what role they might
ideally play, I propose that we should examine carefully how international law has actually influenced domestic legal systems in post-conflict
settings and develop justice models shaped from these realities. In so
doing, I conclude that international courts have a useful role to play,
but one that is substantially more circumscribed than that proposed by
some supporters (and thus, I would argue, more in accord with the
ICC’s original, complementarity-oriented design). Instead of relying
primarily on international or even hybrid courts, I suggest that we
should look to national courts as the primary venues for atrocity trials
and to transnational networks as the best conduit for the international
community and international criminal law to play a constructive role.
To that end, in this Article I examine a particular set of interactions between the international legal community and the domestic
legal system in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC” or
“Congo”). The atrocities that have taken place in the DRC are at the
heart of the controversy over the effectiveness of international courts.
The International Criminal Court’s first trial, prosecuting a Congolese militia leader for war crimes for using child soldiers, was to have
started in June 2008.9 Its jeopardized progress stands in the public eye
7 Compare Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals,
93 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2005) (arguing against independent international tribunals), with M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 Ind. Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 1, 34–35 (1991).
8 See Burke-White, supra note 2, at 58; Turner, supra note 2, at 51.
9 Press Release, ICC, The Trial in the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Will Commence
on 23 June 2008 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&
id=348&l=en.html.
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as the first test of the ICC’s long-debated effectiveness.10 But there is
more than this at stake for international criminal law in the Congo.
The ICC’s Rome Statute has already had a tangible impact on trials
within the DRC, where some domestic military courts have used the
Statute in prosecuting defendants for war crimes and crimes against
humanity.11 They are the first national courts in the world to apply the
Rome Statute directly in criminal trials.
Understanding how the Congolese courts came to deploy international law in these atrocity trials requires us to adopt a relatively complex model of the relationships between national and international
courts and between national and international criminal law, one that
embraces the indirect conduits, the highly individualistic and resourceintensive means, and the inconsistent results that characterize the reality of transitional justice in post-conflict settings. Key characteristics of
this model include: (1) reliance on transnational networks to convey
international criminal law and international resources into domestic
settings, rather than on international courts; (2) hybrid internationalnational processes in which international actors play a supporting,
rather than a controlling, role; and (3) integration of international
support for atrocity trials into broader efforts to rebuild national judicial systems.
ICC supporters might like to see the Rome Statute’s use in domestic courts in the Congo as evidence that the ICC has succeeded already
in spreading its influence far beyond its own trials to the inner workings
of national tribunals. This development, however, cannot be credited to
the ICC itself, which has limited its activities in the Congo to pursuing
and promoting its own investigations. It has had little if any institutional
10 As of the time of the final edit of this article, the case had been stayed because the
prosecution failed to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense. See Prosecutor v. Lubango Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Consequences of NonDisclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(3) Agreements (Oct. 21,
2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-1486-ENG.pdf. It
is uncertain whether the court will ever permit the prosecutor to proceed with the case.
Prosecutor v. Lubango Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Oct. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Decision on the Release of Lubanga Dyilo], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-1487-ENG.pdf.
11 See generally Auditeur Militaire v. Ngoy, No. RMP 154/PEN/SHOF/05, RP 084/2006,
Tribunal Militaire de Garnison [Military Garrison Court] Mbandaka, Apr. 12, 2006 (Dem.
Rep. Congo) [hereinafter Ngoy case] (on file with author); Auditeur Militaire v. Massaba,
No. RMP 242/PEN/06, RP 018/2006, Tribunal Militaire de Garnison [Military Garrison
Court] Ituri, Mar. 24, 2006 (Dem. Rep. Congo) [hereinafter Massaba case] (on file with
author). But see Auditeur Militaire v. Katamisi, RMP 249/KK/05, RP 011/05, slip op. at 5–
6, Tribunal Militaire de Garnison [Military Garrison Court] Kindu, Oct. 26, 2005 (Dem.
Rep. Congo) [hereinafter Katamisi case] (on file with author).
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influence upon the involved national courts. The Rome Statute serves
here as a source of law, and the DRC’s decision to ratify the Rome Statute and to self-refer its situation to the ICC has created positive background conditions that encourage national trials. But the ICC as an
institution has been bypassed by transnational networks of UN officers,
NGOs, embassy officials, local lawyers and judges. These networks have
been working avidly to support these national trials in a variety of ways,
including promoting the use of international law.
Nor does this importation of international criminal norms fit into
a triumphalist account of ever-increasing domestic compliance with
international law, in which transnational networks bring about a decisive transformation of national law. Domestic authorities, not international ones, were and remain predominant in the Congo, and what has
taken place there is a domestically controlled process in which transnational networks have played a facilitative and supportive role. Furthermore, the incorporation of international norms has been uneven and
partial. These few trials are exceptions to the general rule of impunity
for Congo’s ubiquitous atrocities, and political interference has sidelined trials both before and after those in which the Rome Statute has
figured prominently. But for exactly these reasons, it is all the more
crucial to explore the dynamic interactions between international and
national laws, institutions, and actors that have produced these unexpected pockets of justice (or, at least, of legal process).
Furthermore, the efforts of these transnational networks to advance domestic atrocity trials and to promote the use of international
law within them have not been isolated ones. Rather, they have been
embedded in and interdependent with efforts to rebuild the national
judicial system. Seeking justice for war crimes and crimes against humanity drew attention to the lack of a functioning legal system in the
DRC and both catalyzed and focused redevelopment. In practical
terms, to hold trials, courtrooms were needed, as well as judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys. Imperfections in the trials have highlighted areas of needed reform and created focal points for advocacy;
for example, lacunae in the laws against sexual violence came to light,
and advocates pressed for passage of new legislation remedying the
gaps. The organizations and individuals that make up these transnational networks are working for post-conflict justice in the broadest possible sense: the development of a national justice system that can hear
cases concerning all the myriad instantiations of injustice stemming
from the conflict, from the instances of extreme violence that constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity to problems of contested
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property rights, internally displaced persons, and newly endemic sexual
violence.
How justice for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity should best be pursued is a contentious and long-debated topic
that raises fundamental questions concerning the respective roles of
international and national laws and actors. Part I of this Article briefly
reviews the recent development of this issue, from the international
community’s development of international courts to the turn to hybrid courts, followed by the most recent shift in emphasis from international trials as such to international influence.
Part II examines the international-national interaction in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, making use of my firsthand research
in the DRC. I visited Kinshasa in June and July 2006, conducting interviews with members of the international and domestic legal communities, attending public meetings, and gathering court judgments
and other documents not otherwise available.12 Two aspects of the
scope of this study should be noted at the outset: it is focused upon
national courts, not local courts or other local justice mechanisms,13
and these national courts are military courts, not civilian ones.14 The
reason for these choices is simple enough: this is where atrocity trials

12 See infra note 79 (explaining this Article’s research method).
13 There is a vigorous debate about the role of local justice mechanisms vis-à-vis national and international trials. See, e.g., Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking
Local Justice as Transitional Justice, 79 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2006); Jennifer Widner, Courts and
Democracy in Postconflict Transitions: A Social Scientist’s Perspective on the African Case, 95 Am. J.
Int’l L. 64, 65 (2001). Although this debate is important, I will not engage with it in any
depth. I am concerned here with the influence of international law, and international
influence on truly local entities in the DRC is quite limited due to the mechanisms by
which it is spread and the relative isolation of local institutions. Furthermore, the comparative merits of local justice systems are highly context-dependent. Accordingly, to the
extent that I use the word “local” in discussing national or hybrid tribunals, it is meant to
indicate that they are more local than international tribunals and not to refer to subnational systems.
14 In a country with a fully functioning system of civilian courts and a parallel system of
military courts, one would not necessarily regard military courts as the country’s “national
courts.” In the DRC, however, the civilian court system has been decimated and is nonexistent in many parts of the country. The military courts are in effect functioning as national
courts for some purposes, including holding atrocity trials like those discussed in this Article. The use of the military courts as national courts can be and has been criticized, but
there is no doubt that this is how they are functioning in the DRC. Thus, my treatment of
military courts as national courts in this Article reflects this reality and is neither an endorsement of the use of military courts as such nor a claim that military courts are necessarily the equivalent of a national court system in other contexts. See infra notes 95–124 and
accompanying text.
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are being heard, and it is accordingly where international interveners
concerned with such trials are focusing their efforts.
Part II first examines the judgments in three exemplary atrocity
trials. Two of the three courts used the Rome Statute, at least in part;
the third used only national law. Comparing these judgments reveals a
number of tangible effects of the national courts’ choice of law: the
courts using the Rome Statute tended to adopt international definitions of crimes, international due process standards, and protections
for victims and witnesses, at least as they describe it in their judgments.
Looking beyond those judgments to the process by which the Rome
Statute was promoted in the DRC explodes any simple construct of the
relationship between the International Criminal Court and domestic
courts or of the mechanisms by which international law is incorporated
in domestic settings. International law did not enter these cases
through traditional means such as legislative implementation or consideration of international jurisprudence, nor even through the direct
involvement of the ICC. Rather, the use of international law and the
trials themselves were spurred by the work of transnational networks on
the broader goals of post-conflict justice and rebuilding the national
justice system. Theories of international lawmaking, such as theories of
transnational networks,15 transnational legal process,16 policy-oriented
jurisprudence,17 and legal pluralism,18 focus attention on critical aspects of these networks that enabled them to convey international law
effectively in a chaotic post-conflict context. Two factors are particularly
important: (1) what I call the networks’ “functional hybrid” character,
strategically incorporating elements of the international and the national, and (2) the fact that formal authority and effective control are
maintained in domestic hands.
Finally, the Conclusion returns to some of the fundamental questions that were raised in Part I and that lurk beneath the discussion of
the Congolese trials in Part II. In particular, some readers may harbor
doubts that international support for national trials is wise in light of
the deficiencies of many post-conflict national justice systems. Indeed,
15 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
Stan. J. Int’l L. 283 (2004).
16 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181
(1996).
17 See generally W. Michael Reisman et al., The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction, 32
Yale J. Int’l L. 575 (2007).
18 See generally Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1155
(2007).
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in this Article, I detail some of the problems of the Congolese national courts, which are non-existent in some areas and suffer from
political interference, corruption, and a lack of resources in others.
Nonetheless, I contend that, in spite of these legitimate concerns,
the international community should endorse, promote, and support
national trials—and what’s more, that this may be the most important
contribution the international community can make to the cause of
post-conflict justice. In my view, we must take as a given that trials in
post-conflict countries are likely to be less than optimal in a variety of
ways. The question that we should consider is: in light of that, how
can we best promote the goals of post-conflict justice? Thus far, the
common approach has been to hold constant as an irreducible, nonnegotiable value our commitment to trials that meet international
due process standards and to do what it takes to achieve that commitment in the immediate term: that is, to hold trials in international
courts insofar as possible and to discourage and criticize national trials that do not meet international standards.19 I suggest here that the
ordinary failings of national tribunals do not present a sufficient reason for international withdrawal. To the contrary, the ultimate successful functioning of national legal systems should be treated as the
most important goal of post-conflict justice,20 and atrocity trials present an opportunity for investment in these systems.
This view is informed, not by idealism about the likelihood of
comprehensive post-conflict legal and judicial reform, but rather by an
amalgam of belief and skepticism: belief in the grave importance of
such reform, and skepticism about the prospects for achieving other
frequently cited goals of post-conflict justice (reconciliation, deterrence, truth-telling, and so on) through criminal trials, whether international or national. In my assessment, the best that can be hoped for
in the Congo is a few trials that hold a few people accountable. National trials will not be of the high-ranked and powerful, for those people will be able to shield themselves from prosecution through some
combination of monetary and political influence; rather, they will be of
19 See Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the
Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 Crim. L.F. 255, 280 (2006); see also David Luban, A
Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 85, 142–43 (2004). But see Mark A.
Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law 7 (2007) (critiquing this approach).
20 For a comprehensive discussion of post-conflict development of rule of law following international interventions, see generally Jane Stromseth et al., Can Might Make
Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (2006).
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the low-ranking soldiers and militia members who carried out the
atrocities and have no such pull. International trials, although aimed at
higher ranks, will take only those who can no longer protect themselves
in this higher arena. Neither national nor international trials will be
procedurally pristine, and although international trials will likely hew
to higher due process standards than national ones, long delays in moving to trial and drawn-out procedures will undermine public faith in
the proceedings. Trials, national and international, will not deter the
continued commission of atrocities in the current conflict in eastern
Congo, which has only escalated since the instigation of legal sanctions
internationally and nationally.
Therefore, the goal in the Congo cannot be justice absolute, ideal
and untarnished, but rather must be partial justice—justice for at least
some victims, through imperfect processes, with the meager but nonetheless ambitious aim of ending the certainty of impunity, rather than
ending impunity itself. With the carefully tailored intervention of the
international community in national trials, more trials will be held, and
they will be fairer trials than they would have been otherwise. Most important, with the intervention of the international community in national trials, there will be urgently needed international investment into
the reconstruction of the domestic legal system. Of course, it is not a
single step from investment in national trials to the successful restoration of an entire legal system. Furthermore, I do not mean to suggest
that all international intervention is necessarily constructive; to the
contrary, the history of deliberate manipulation and unintended consequences of such intervention is long enough that any such efforts
should be careful indeed. Nor do I argue that the international community should support any and all national trials without criteria or
distinction. But I do contend that it is only by investing in weak, corrupt, and deeply flawed national courts that the international community can promote what should be the ultimate goal of post-conflict justice efforts: rebuilding national justice systems.
I. The Roles of International, National, and Hybrid Courts
The international community has long debated the proper role for
international law and international institutions in addressing grave
atrocities. Its latest response has been to create international courts:
first ad hoc tribunals, and then the International Criminal Court. As
the limits of these international tribunals have become evident, however, attention has turned first to hybrid courts and now to interactions
between the International Criminal Court and either hybrid or na-
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tional courts. In my view, these developments track in a positive direction. They move away from a view of international and national courts
as competing alternatives and toward the development of institutions
that allow for greater interaction between international and national
actors; they also move away from the expectation that the responsibility
for trials could be or should be shifted to the international arena and
toward an expectation that national courts must shoulder the primary
burden of holding such trials. I propose that we should take this progression a step further by recognizing: (1) that the international community can and does act through institutions other than courts and (2)
that the benefits of hybridization and international-national interaction
may be better achieved through some of these other mechanisms.
A. International Courts as a Substitute for National Courts
Supporters of international criminal courts envisioned them playing a transformative role in international criminal law. For a long time,
of course, the responsibility for trying cases of war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity rested with national authorities, as for
forty years after Nuremburg there were no more international tribunals.21 The new international criminal courts—first the ad hoc tribunals
and then the International Criminal Court—were intended to be the
mechanism by which the international community could reassert its
interest and compensate both for post-conflict states’ failures to prosecute these crimes and for the inadequacies of their national courts.
High hopes indeed were held out for the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court. The ICC would embody the international
community’s conviction that these crimes are international in character
and must not merely be condemned rhetorically but also criminalized
and punished in fact by the international community. In effect, it would
mark a dramatic step toward the end of impunity for international
crimes.22
Now that we have had the opportunity to observe international
courts in operation, these high expectations have been tempered by
the reality of their imperfect performance. Rather than offering a
clearly superior alternative to national courts in practice, international
courts contend with political pressures, due process violations, and
other problems that overlap to some extent with those faced by na21 See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal
Court 5–15 (3d ed. 2007).
22 See Schabas, supra note 21, at 20; Bassiouni, supra note 7, at 33–34.
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tional courts. There are many threads in the discussion of the relative
merits of national and international courts, from the effects of trials on
political and security concerns to questions of community healing and
collective memory, among others.23 For purposes of this brief background discussion, I will focus on the functionalist and normative arguments raised in favor of international and national courts.24
In functionalist terms, international courts are frequently held out
in the literature as more likely to be impartial, have well qualified
judges and staff, develop uniform international law, uphold due process norms, and be viewed as satisfactory by the international community. National courts are often described as acting in closer proximity to
the victim population, with the result that their actions are more likely
to be known by that population; however, they have also been described
as unlikely to be capable of holding fair trials, at risk of political influence, and prone to creating disparate substantive standards that risk
undermining the development of common international norms.25 Of
course, these descriptions are contestable and have been contested,
particularly as international courts have proliferated and their activities
in practice have become available for criticism.26
It is true that a post-conflict state’s own judicial system is often
damaged or compromised in some respects. However, the extent and
nature of this damage or compromise varies considerably: Kosovo’s
courts are not Congo’s are not Rwanda’s, and so on. Of these, each had
a different court system with different strengths and weaknesses preconflict (generalizing broadly, discrimination in Kosovo, corruption in
23 E.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 Law & Contemp. Prob. 9, 15 (1996); Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The
Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537, 2539 (1991);
Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 69, 83–84 (2003).
24 The development of universal jurisdiction laws in a few states and several high profile cases complicated the common wisdom on international and domestic courts and drew
extensive commentary. See generally Lelia Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35
New Eng. L. Rev. 241 (2001); Beth Van Schaack, Justice Without Borders: Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 99 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 120 (2005). However, because my focus is on the
interaction between international law and national courts within post-conflict states, I do
not address universal jurisdiction cases here.
25 Steven R. Ratner & Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights
Atrocities in International Law 159–61 (1997); José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes
of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 365, 375–76 (1999) (describing but not
adopting these views); Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Toward Criminal Prosecution
and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. 2, 2, 5–7
(1998).
26 Drumbl, supra note 19, at 129–33; Alvarez, supra note 25, at 395–403; Stromseth, supra note 3, at 268–69.
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Congo, and political interference and inadequate legal training in
Rwanda).27 Each suffered a different kind of conflict (Kosovo’s insurgency and invasion, Congo’s long wars, Rwanda’s genocide) that did
different sorts of harm to the judicial system (Kosovo’s was dismantled,
Congo’s fell into dysfunction, and many of Rwanda’s lawyers and judges
were killed).28 As a result, each has different levels of structural integrity, resources, and personnel; different interests shared with different
parts of the population; and different levels and kinds of political interference—and these are only three examples. Such details are of course
crucial in assessing national court systems’ capabilities.
On the other hand, the presumptions of legitimacy and competence accorded to international courts by supporters seem to be less
grounded in reality. They are also less likely to be shared by domestic
observers. This, as much as the pragmatic difficulty of effective publicity and outreach to a domestic audience from a distant international
locale, is a fundamental problem that has undermined the ad hoc international tribunals’ effectiveness in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Disparate international and domestic views on international courts
may be inevitable since, as José Alvarez argues, in spite of rhetoric
about “the need for accountability to victims, U.N. fora, including the
ad hoc tribunals, are in reality most accountable to their direct patrons—the international community.”29 When international institutions
are viewed by national communities as taking one side in a dispute, as
in the former Yugoslavia, decisions by international judges in international courts like the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) are not likely to be viewed as impartial by those
communities, whatever international observers may think.30 This le27 See Mark Baskin, Pearson Peacekeeping Ctr., Lessons Learned on UNMIK Judiciary 14 (Pearson Paper No. 8, 2002) (describing Kosovo); William A. Schabas, Justice,
Democracy, and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems,
7 Crim. L.F. 523, 531 (1996) (describing Rwanda); Laura A. Dickinson, Comment, The
Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 295, 297 (2003) (describing Kosovo); Human
Rights Watch, Rwanda: Human Rights Developments, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/
WR94/Africa-06.htm#P258_112461 (last visited Sept. 27, 2008) (describing Rwanda); Human
Rights Watch, Zaire: Human Rights Developments, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/
WR96/Africa-11.htm#P843_201190 (last visited Sept. 27, 2008) (describing the Congo).
28 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers, Leandro Despouy, Addendum: Preliminary Note on the Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶¶ 1–5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/25/Add.3 (May 24, 2007); Elena A.
Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 10–11 (2007); Schabas,
supra note 27, at 533 (discussing Rwanda).
29 Alvarez, supra note 25, at 410.
30 Baskin, supra note 27, at 12, 21.
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gitimacy gap tends to be compounded by the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in choosing a few defendants from the many involved in the
atrocities, as well as discretionary prosecutorial and judicial decisions
concerning charging and sentencing, as Mark Drumbl and Mark Osiel
have observed.31 Finally, in spite of the expectation that the ad hoc international tribunals would offer a guarantee of due process for defendants, their proceedings have not been beyond critique on this front
either, as is perhaps inevitable in this quickly evolving area of international law.32
Thus, a comparison of the relative merits of international and
national courts, from a functionalist perspective, suggests that the apparent legitimacy gap between them is less clear cut than it at first appeared. Moreover, the disparate conditions of national tribunals, the
complex political and social situations in post-conflict states, and the
varying relationships of the international community to these states
all indicate that generalizations about the pros and cons of national
and international courts will not necessarily be applicable in any particular situation.33
Some part of the debate over the proper roles of international
and national institutions has also been normative, concerning the nature of the values and interests at stake. Some argue that international
crimes are international by virtue of their nature as heinous atrocities
and that the international community accordingly has an interest in
prosecuting that supersedes local interests. So understood, national
trials fail to properly account for or redress the crimes committed.34 A
contrasting view gives greater emphasis to the immediate harm done
31 See Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of
Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 539, 593 (2005); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning
Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1815 (2005). See generally José E.
Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2031 (1998) (critiquing the ICTY on similar grounds). Mark Osiel suggests that international prosecutors’ very
efforts to “signal impartiality” by prosecuting defendants from all sides of a conflict tend to
undercut the legitimacy of international tribunals in the eyes of the affected national
communities by marrying a “seeming symmetry” of defendants with an actual asymmetry
in the scope and intensity of defendants’ participation in the atrocities. Osiel, supra, at
1815. Mark Drumbl contends that “selectivity and indeterminacy” in the prosecutions and
punishments pursued in the international tribunals undermine their ability to achieve
their core aims before the relevant domestic audience. Drumbl, supra, at 593.
32 Alvarez, supra note 31, at 2061–67.
33 Drumbl, supra note 19, at 181–205; Alvarez, supra note 25, at 369–70; Stromseth, supra note 3, at 260–61.
34 E.g., Luban, supra note 19, at 124–36 (discussing and critiquing this view); Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. 985, 986, 989 (2007).
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and thus to the local interest in justice, construed either as the personal interests of the victims or as the broader interests of the affected
communities.35
As with the functionalist line of argument, much of the normative debate is overgeneralized and insufficiently connected to postconflict states’ on-the-ground realities. Of course, there are often both
local and international interests in cases of war crimes, genocide, and
crimes against humanity. These include the immediate harms suffered and moral outrage at those harms, as well as immediate and in
some cases widespread or even international destabilization and insecurity, to name a few. But just as all conflicts are not identical, the
relative nature and intensity of local and international interests necessarily vary as well. The context-dependent nature of these interests
renders futile attempts to generalize about their relative significance
across cases. Arguably, claims about moral outrage are not contextdependent, but surely they are also by their nature incommensurable.36
But what is more important for purposes of this discussion is that
there is no necessary correlation between the location of an interest
and the best venue for securing that interest. That is, the fact that a
community (whether local, national, or international) has interests at
stake does not necessarily mean that those interests will be served by
trials held by that community’s institutions. Local interests may better
be served in international courts if local institutions are hampered by
conflicting local interests, corruption, or incapacity, for example. Similarly, international interests may be better served in national courts if
the judgments of international tribunals will not reach domestic audiences. Thus, just as the relative strength of international, local, and national interests varies from situation to situation, so also does the capacity of international, local, and national institutions to fulfill those
interests.37
35 Indeed, proponents of this view tend to prefer truly local tribunals, in which the affected community itself defines and controls the justice process, to national tribunals,
which are in many instances not truly local. See Waldorf, supra note 13, at 2–5, 85–87 (expressing a preference for local processes for limited purposes).
36 In particular, while I recognize the international community’s sense of moral outrage as a basis for concern with justice for atrocities, I am not persuaded that its collectve
sense of horror presents an interest that can supersede local ones. Surely its horror is not
more compelling than that of the immediate victims. Cf. Drumbl, supra note 19, at 6. Mark
Drumbl discusses a similar set of concerns in the introduction to his study of sentencing
and punishment in international and national tribunals. See id.
37 A multi-country empirical study of victims’ attitudes revealed divided and nonexclusive support for international and domestic solutions. See Drumbl, supra note 19, at 42.
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Nor are the interests at any level necessarily singular, opposing,
or mutually exclusive. To the contrary, at all levels—international, national, and local—there tend to be multiple actors with different interests, as discussed below in the case of the DRC. The extent to which
international, national, and local interests synchronize or are in tension seems to vary considerably as well.38 Thus, as with pragmatic arguments about institutional function, generalizations about these interests are not likely to tell us much about how they will be served by
choosing either international or national venues for particular atrocity trials.
The idea that I promote here—that relying upon a strict dichotomy between national and international institutions and interests is
neither accurate nor useful—is not a new one. Rather, it pervades international legal theories such as policy-oriented jurisprudence, legal
pluralism, transnational legal process, and global governance, all of
which suggest—in different ways and to different ends—that the relationships between international and national institutions are dynamic
and interactive, complex and multiple.39 Why then has a reliance on
these universalized characteristics lingered so long in this debate?
This suggests a more fundamental critique.
Not only are the above descriptions not necessarily accurate or
useful when applied to particular situations, they rest on an erroneous
underlying set of assumptions: that national and international courts
are in competition as potential venues for trials and that an assessment of their strengths and weaknesses should be directed at choosing between them for this purpose. To the contrary, the idea that international and national courts are competing for trials is virtually
always incorrect. The debate over which courts will handle trials better addresses only those cases that international courts are actually in
a position to try—that is to say, a bare handful. There are typically
hundreds or thousands of perpetrators (and in some instances vastly
more)40 who could be tried in any given situation, and there is no
possibility that any international tribunal will try more than a few of
38 See Waldorf, supra note 13, at 74–82; Dickinson, supra note 27, at 301.
39 See Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New” Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32 Yale J. Int’l L. 455, 455–57 (2007) (noting this commonality also). The dichotomy between international and national institutions
and the presumed hierarchy between them is contested by international law scholars in
other areas as well. E.g., Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible Under
International Law, 24 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 285, 286 (2001).
40 See Scott Straus, How Many Perpetrators Were There in the Rwandan Genocide? An Estimate, 6 J. Genocide Research 85, 95 (2004).
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them (nor, of course, that national tribunals will try more than some
modest percentage either). When we refer to a choice between international and national tribunals, therefore, we are talking about only a
very small subset of all the cases out there in the world.
There are two important consequences of this fact: first, the treatment of international and national courts as alternatives in any practical sense is inapposite in the vast majority of cases. As a consequence,
while many scholars have considered the question of the circumstances
under which the ICC should defer to national tribunals under its complementarity provisions, this question should not be allowed to characterize or dominate our understanding of the relationship between international and national courts.41 Although the question of deference
to national tribunals is crucial for any case that the ICC is actually considering pursuing, these cases are few and far between.
However, hidden within this debate is a real choice with a different set of consequences: a choice about where to allocate international resources. At the most superficial level, in light of the relative
costs of trials in international and national tribunals, there is a decision about the number of cases to be heard. The resources that might
be used to hear only a few cases in an ad hoc international tribunal
could be used to put on some multiple of that number of cases in a
national tribunal, or to provide some limited level of support for an
even greater number of national cases.
More importantly, in light of the structural and developmental
effects of pursuing such cases, a choice about where to commit resources for immediate prosecutions has substantial long-term effects
on the capacities of the affected court systems. Thus, the relevant inquiry is not merely which venue we prefer for the small number of
trials that an international institution might be able to handle, nor
even whether we prefer a smaller or greater number of cases. Rather,
we should be asking where and to what end we want to invest our financial, human, and other resources—in developing international
institutions or in rebuilding domestic ones?42
41 E.g., Schabas, supra note 21, at 182–86; Heller, supra note 19, at 255–57; Madeleine
Morris, Complementarity and Its Discontents: States, Victims, and the International Criminal Court,
in International Crimes, Peace, and Human Rights: The Role of the International
Criminal Court 177, 178 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
42 Of course, the commitment of such resources is not in itself sufficient to rebuild
decimated national systems; rather, atrocity trials present a focal point for such efforts that
must be part of a more comprehensive reform and redevelopment. See generally
Stromseth et al., supra note 20.
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All in all, the focus on dichotomies between international and national institutions represents a distraction from more important questions.43 It has tended to misdirect the conversation away from fruitful,
pragmatic inquiry about the details of each situation and into an abstract and disengaged debate over the theoretical benefits of each form
of institution. It has tended to obscure the important differences
among national courts and to deter inquiry into the strengths and
weaknesses of particular systems. It has tended to focus attention on
immediate outcomes rather than on the goals of long-term investment
and development of judicial systems. By posing international and national courts as opposing alternatives, it has also tended to hamper
creative thinking about productive interaction between the international legal community and national systems, and this is where another
group of scholars has picked up.
B. Hybrid Courts
The first embodiment of a new way of thinking about the interrelationships between international and domestic tribunals was the development of hybrid courts employing both international and national
judges, attorneys, and staff in Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone.
These tribunals undermine the international-national dichotomy, representing a conscious effort to combine some of the benefits of each
court structure by bringing international and local expertise and skills
together in a single tribunal.44 Thus, supporters of hybrid courts contend that they combine international legitimacy with greater efficiency
and proximity to affected populations, more opportunity for influence
upon the domestic legal system, and knowledge of both international
and domestic law.45
While the debate over international versus domestic courts seemed
to assume that both international and national courts are static entities,
possessing a given, known set of positives and negatives, hybrid courts
43 This line of argument echoes those made by scholars in a range of areas of international and transnational law who have identified a complex set of interactions between
international, national, and sub-national systems that do not follow strict hierarchical lines.
E.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 863, 864–65 (2006); Paul
Schiff Berman, Dialectical Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 929, 940
(2006).
44 See Sarah M.H. Nouwen, “Hybrid Courts”: The Hybrid Category of a New Type of International Crimes Courts, 2 Utrecht L. Rev. 190, 213 (2006).
45 See William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1, 24 (2002); Turner, supra note 2, at 37–39;
Dickinson, supra note 27, at 300.
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offer a venue for interaction and mutual influence.46 Accordingly, advocates propose measuring the success of international involvement by
the results of these relationships, and in particular, by their effects beyond the individual cases on the reconstruction of the national judicial
system. For example, William Burke-White sets out as “successes” of the
hybrid courts in East Timor the reconstruction of courthouses and
other buildings and the mutual learning by East Timorese and foreign
judges comprising the special panels hearing cases.
Although I wholeheartedly approve of this fundamental shift in
conceptualizing international-national court relations, I nonetheless
think that hybrid courts have thus far failed to fulfill their promise.
Among all the possible critiques of hybrid courts,47 one is particularly
important for our discussion here: the foreign judges in hybrid tribunals are often unable to carry out the weighty tasks assigned to them.
The responsibility for producing the benefits of hybrid courts over
national courts in these accounts rests primarily on the shoulders of
the involved international judges. It is they who will introduce international norms and maintain standards of due process and impartiality, and they who will rub shoulders with their local counterparts on a
day-to-day basis, sharing crucial knowledge and experience.48
But although expertise is no small part of foreign judges’ purported “value added” to the proceedings, hybrid courts do not typically deliver the foreign expertise they promise. There are very few
judges who have both an in depth knowledge of international law and
extensive trial experience, much less knowledge of the correct “family” of law (civil or common, depending on the circumstances).49 In
addition, it can be extremely difficult to persuade those few foreign
jurists with such qualifications and experience to take up positions in
conflict and post-conflict zones.50 Furthermore, unless a judge with all
these qualifications also happens to have the relevant language skills,
46 See Burke-White, supra note 45, at 63.
47 For example, like ad hoc international courts, hybrid courts must be established for
each new crisis, incurring startup costs and delays. Also, hybrid tribunals may in fact offer
little connection to the national population depending on their provenance, location, and
practices such as whether they apply international or national law. See Nouwen, supra note
44, at 214. Furthermore, while their international colleagues may perceive international
judges as impartial, their domestic counterparts may disagree. See Baskin, supra note 27, at
35.
48 See Dickinson, supra note 27, at 304.
49 Baskin, supra note 27, at 23; Cesare P.R. Romano, The Judges and Prosecutors of Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals, in Internationalized Criminal Courts 235,
254 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004).
50 Baskin, supra note 27, at 23; see Romano, supra note 49, at 254.
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the level of interaction among the foreign and domestic judges will be
sharply limited by the need for constant translation.
Consequently, the foreign judges who actually serve in hybrid tribunals frequently do not have the necessary experience and knowledge
to fulfill the important role that hybrid courts demand of them. In Sierra Leone, although most of the judges have lengthy judicial experience of some kind, only two of the eight foreign judges on the court
appear to have any experience whatsoever with international criminal
law. Of the five foreign judges serving in the court’s trial chambers, at
least two appear to have no experience whatsoever presiding over a trial
court.51 The UN Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”) also struggled to recruit international judges to Kosovo to serve on hybrid panels there.
National judges complained bitterly about foreign judges’ lack of experience and lack of interaction on the bench,52 and the overall level of
interaction between international and national judges in Kosovo has
apparently been quite low.53
This is not to suggest that hybrid courts will necessarily perform
worse than national courts in meting out justice in individual cases. As
described above, national courts also frequently struggle with problems of limited expertise and experience amongst their judges; indeed, these are the very reasons that mixed panels of national and
foreign judges were proposed in the first place.54 But it does seem that
hybrid courts do not typically offer the distinct advantages touted by
their supporters—importation of expertise, transfer of knowledge and
skills, and intensive transnational interaction—and they are far from
an ideal solution to the problems faced by national courts.
In spite of these flaws, hybrid tribunals do offer a venue in which
interaction between international and national actors is not merely
possible but necessary to the functioning of the tribunal. Thus, I do not
suggest that hybrid institutions should be rejected wholesale. Rather, it
is important to consider carefully the factors affecting the success of
hybrid institutions’ transnational interchange. Hybrid courts demand
of their international participants immersion into difficult living conditions in foreign states, management of complex trials in contentious
51 See Special Court of Sierra Leone, Chambers, http://www.sc-sl.org/chambers.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
52 Whether correct or not, these complaints indicate a dearth of positive relations and
good feelings among the international and domestic jurists serving together in Kosovo.
Baskin, supra note 27, at 10, 21.
53 Id. at 35.
54 See Dickinson, supra note 27, at 303–04, 307.
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political and social settings, and effective communication with foreign
counterparts. It is certainly understandable in hindsight that mid- and
late-career professionals who have not committed themselves to such
experiences as a career choice are unlikely to be the best people to
handle such a role.
Of course, some of these factors might be hoped to change in the
future: for example, as international and hybrid tribunals addressing
international crimes proliferate, one might expect a larger corps of
judges with expertise in international criminal law to develop as well.
Certainly, the effectiveness of hybrid courts could be improved by
greater attention to this concern. Nonetheless, the difficulty of enticing
mid- and late-career jurists to the living conditions common in postconflict countries for trials that may last for years is, in my view, likely to
remain an extremely salient factor.
This suggests that hybrid institutions might perform more successfully if they were structured so as to rely instead on personnel who
are at an earlier stage in their career, who are committed to an expatriate lifestyle, and who are likely to have had the opportunity to gain
the relevant expertise. This is not a model that hybrid courts are likely
to be able to use; rather, it suggests that other sorts of hybrid institutions and processes might be more effective at promoting constructive
transnational interactions and conveying international resources into
post-conflict domestic systems.
C. The ICC and Interactions with Other Courts
As the International Criminal Court has become active, conducting investigations, issuing arrest warrants, and preparing for its first
trial, efforts to reconstitute the role of international courts have now
turned to the ICC and its relationship with other tribunals. For the ICC
had no sooner been created than both supporters and critics quickly
identified aspects of the Rome Statute that seemed to guarantee sharp
limits to the ICC’s effectiveness in trying perpetrators and a continued
reliance on national courts. Some of these concerns are familiar from
the discussion of international and national courts above. For example,
limited capacity and resources could prevent the ICC from pursuing
more than a few cases and hamper effective prosecution in those it
chooses to pursue. Others are particular to the ICC, such as its complementarity regime, which enables states to shield their citizens from
prosecution by a sufficient show of investigation and/or prosecution.
At the outset, many also assumed that states where the ICC crimes were
commonplace occurrences would not ratify, leaving the ICC bereft of
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jurisdiction over crimes committed within their borders, absent another connection to a state party or a Security Council referral.55
There is no doubt that the potential for the ICC’s impact as a trial
court is limited, not only for the listed reasons but also because it will
likely face difficulties with domestic perceptions of legitimacy and fairness like those that the ad hoc tribunals have experienced. Indeed,
such questions have already arisen in the DRC, where the public has
long questioned the Lubanga case as being a highly selective prosecution of a single midlevel defendant for a crime—using child soldiers—
that virtually all participants in the conflict committed and that many
view as relatively minor in the face of other extensive and widespread
atrocities.56 An ICC trial chamber’s order that Lubanga be released because of the prosecution’s failure to disclose potentially exculpatory
evidence can only have exacerbated public concern over the ICC’s legitimacy.57 Faced with an array of complex, chaotic situations and able
to proceed only at a deliberate pace and to prosecute only a few people, the ICC is at risk of being written off as irrelevant just as it begins
its work.
Nevertheless, although the ICC will be hard pressed to fulfill expectations for its role as a trial court, it has received more cooperation
than expected from national governments thus far, with the notable
exception of the Sudan.58 Many states have voluntarily participated in
55 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 91–94; Steven R. Ratner, The International Criminal Court and the Limits of Global Judicialization, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 445, 452 (2003); Leila
Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 Geo. L.J. 381, 459 (2000); see also José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half)
Truths and Consequences, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 405, 420–21 (2003); Mahnoush H. Arsanjani &
W. Michael Reisman, The Law-In-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 Am. J. Int’l L.
385, 386 (2005).
56 Interview with Paul Madidi, Pub. Info. & Outreach Officer, ICC, in Kinshasa, Dem.
Rep. Congo ( July 6, 2006) [hereinafter Madidi Interview] (notes on file with author).
Although Lubanga was for a long time the only person facing prosecution, as of March
2008 there are two additional Congolese defendants, and both have been charged with
other crimes beyond the use of child soldiers. See International Criminal Court, Case Information Sheet, The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga, http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/
cases/DRC-18-10-07_En.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2008); Press Release, ICC, Third
Detainee for the International Criminal Court: Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Feb. 7, 2008),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=329&l=en.html.
57 This decision was reversed and remanded for reconsideration on appeal; at the time
of the final edit of this Article, the case was stayed, and the trial chamber had not yet ruled
on the issue on remand. Decision on the Release of Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 10.
58 See, e.g., Press Release, ICC, ICC Prosecutor: “Massive Crimes Continue to Be Committed in Darfur Today, Sudan Is Not Complying with Security Council Resolution 1593
and Is Not Cooperating with the Court” (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.
int/press/pressreleases/307.html.
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the Rome Statute treaty regime, including a number of states with ongoing conflicts involving crimes of the sort the ICC might investigate
and prosecute.59 Further, the assumption that, even if they ratified the
Rome Statute, states would necessarily resist ICC involvement in their
conflicts and post-conflict justice processes was proved false by Uganda,
the DRC, and the Central African Republic, all of which have selfreferred situations to the ICC.60 It is true that the Ugandan government
has since shifted its position on ICC involvement in efforts to reach a
peace agreement.61 This illustrates an important point for understanding the phenomenon of surprising national cooperation with the ICC:
the complexity and multiplicity of national positions. Rather than acting as monolithic entities with a single interest (maintaining maximum
sovereignty), these states have pursued more complex sets of interests,
driven by internal factions and individual actors with competing concerns. Some of these domestic actors have at times found it useful to
draw in international institutions.62 Others, at times, have not. But at no
time have domestic actors been driven solely by an interest in sovereignty or by any other single unified interest.
This voluntary cooperation with the ICC has raised hopes for the
ICC’s effectiveness in several senses.63 Most important for purposes of
59 For example, in addition to the DRC, Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad,
and Uganda are parties. ICC, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icccpi.int/asp/statesparties.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
60 Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC ( Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
pressrelease_details&id=16&l=en.html; Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral
Concerning Central African Republic ( Jan. 7, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
pressrelease_details&id=87&l=en.html; Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Receives Referral of
the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Apr. 19, 2004) [hereinafter ICC April
2004 Press Release], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=19&l=
en.html. Of course, whether the ICC will be able to play a role in Uganda is now in question. See Jeffrey Gettleman & Alexis Okeowo, Rebels Delay Landmark Peace Deal in Uganda,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 2008, at A10.
61 Gettleman & Okeowo, supra note 60.
62 See supra note 60. Involving international actors may be useful to pressure others, to
increase their own relative strength or to create international ties. See, e.g., Burke-White,
supra note 45, at 30, 36 (discussing Cambodia). In the DRC, for example, there is a sense
that President Kabila’s relatively clean-handed government benefited from the threat that
ICC prosecutions posed to his political opponents. See William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 Leiden J. Int’l L. 557, 565–66 (2005) [hereinafter Burke-White, Complementarity].
63 It seems that in at least some instances states will voluntarily turn over defendants
and cooperate with investigations so that the ICC will be more likely to successfully pursue
at least those prosecutions. (Thus far, this has been true in the DRC but not so in Sudan.)
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this discussion is the hope that, even if the ICC were not able to make
its mark through its own trials, it might be able to purvey its influence
with these surprisingly receptive national audiences by affecting the
trials held by more localized courts.64 After all, national institutions are
not all cut from one cloth either, and the same political elites who
found it in their interest to cooperate with the ICC might also find it in
their interest to promote national trials.
Accordingly, some ICC advocates are drawing from the idea of dynamic international-national interaction that was introduced in the hybrid court context to suggest that, to succeed, the ICC will have to pursue more active engagement with national and/or hybrid courts. Some
of these proposals suggest moderate levels of interaction. For example,
Laura Dickinson advocates a model centered around hybrid courts that
would handle lower level cases in lieu of national courts.65 In this
model, the ICC would engage in some modest joint efforts with these
hybrid courts but would remain focused primarily on its own trials.
Other proposals would amount to a total shift in the ICC’s mandate, in which the ICC would redirect its energies from its own trials to
participating in and/or supporting hybrid or national courts. Jenia
Turner has suggested that the ICC reorganize itself as a “traveling
court,” recasting its primary role as participating in local trials with local
lawyers and judges in specially created hybrid courts.66 In a similar vein,
William Burke-White has proposed a system of “proactive complementarity” in which the ICC would “encourage, and perhaps even assist” with
prosecutions in national courts.67 In what he calls the “strongest version”
of his proposal, the ICC would be heavily involved in encouraging national trials by pressing political actors to hold them, providing technical
It also seems that the ICC may well be having some general effect in shifting the incentive
structure and perceived interests of post-conflict states.
64 Some fear that this cooperation indicates the abrogation of domestic responsibility
to prosecute and the use of the ICC for the political purpose of undercutting political
opponents. Antonio Cassese, Is the ICC Still Having Teething Problems?, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just.
434, 436 (2006); Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of “Self-Referrals” a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 J.
Int’l Crim. Just. 949, 952 (2004); see also Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 55, at 387 n.9.
However, this fear seems to be somewhat misplaced, since two of the three self-referrals
thus far were at the request of the ICC Prosecutor, who had independently decided to
open an investigation into those situations under his own authority if a referral were not
forthcoming from the state in question. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Keynote Address at the
Future of Human Rights at the Samuel Dash Conference on Human Rights at Georgetown
University Law Center: The Role of the International Criminal Court in Preventing Mass
Atrocities (Apr. 8, 2008) (notes on file with author).
65 Dickinson, supra note 27, at 308–09.
66 Turner, supra note 2, at 17, 22–23, 35–36.
67 Burke-White, supra note 2, at 56.
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assistance and support for them, and working on domestic judicial reform.68
Perhaps recognizing the pragmatic realities that make it unlikely
that these ambitious proposals will be implemented, both Burke-White
and Turner also offer more moderate suggestions. In Burke-White’s
more limited version, the court would play an essentially hortatory role
consisting mainly of encouragement rather than assistance.69 Likewise,
Turner suggests that, if national governments are willing but unable to
prosecute, ICC officials could provide logistical support and expertise
to domestic officials, investigators, prosecutors, and judges.70 Both recognize that the ICC might profit from making use of transnational networks for these purposes.71
There are a number of important aspects of this discussion for our
purposes. First, both Burke-White and Turner treat national courts as
the primary venues for atrocity trials. Indeed, while Turner reaches this
conclusion reluctantly, encouraging national courts to prosecute is at
the core of Burke-White’s analysis in all its versions.72 Their turn toward
renewed consideration of national courts and in particular toward a
focus on the interactions between national courts and their international counterparts is in my view a positive one. It represents a more
realistic assessment of the prospects for development of post-conflict
justice. For one thing, national courts are and will continue to be on
the front lines when it comes to trying defendants for atrocities within
their jurisdictions. Hybrid and international courts are simply too few
and too slow to take on the lion’s share of this work.
Beyond this, if our focus is upon conveying international norms
and resources into national systems, contrary to popular opinion, the
foreign judges imported by hybrid courts often do not provide a good
conduit for either one. I should be clear: this is not to suggest that national courts will necessarily do a better job than hybrid courts at, for
example, trying individual cases efficiently or maintaining due process
norms. They might do equally well or better; however, they might very
well do worse. But if our ultimate goal is to rebuild national court systems, as I contend it should be, supporting atrocity trials in national
68 See id. at 86. Burke-White considers his proposal to be within the literal terms of the
ICC’s mandate, but, as noted below, he concedes that it may not have been the intent of
the drafters. See id. at 76; see also infra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
69 Burke-White, supra note 2, at 85–86.
70 Turner, supra note 2, at 30–35.
71 Burke-White, supra note 2, at 98; Turner, supra note 2, at 32.
72 See Burke-White, supra note 2, at 57–58; Turner, supra note 2, at 30–35.
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courts provides an opportunity to work toward this goal. Furthermore,
other hybrid mechanisms—what I call “functional hybrids” —are a better means for doing so.73
I am skeptical, however, of Turner’s and Burke-White’s proposals
that the ICC itself might devote any substantial resources to assisting
with national trials, much less undergo the substantial reorganization
and reorientation that their proposals would seem to require. For one
thing, the ICC is currently fully engaged in its own process of institution-building to develop its capacity to prepare for and hold trials.74
Indeed, resource limitations are no small part of the reason that BurkeWhite ultimately endorses a less active role for the ICC in national
prosecutions.75
Certainly Turner’s and Burke-White’s arguments that such a major
shift in direction lies within the ICC’s mandate may be intellectually
appealing to some. However, it took a series of long, hard-fought negotiations for the states parties to reach agreement on this mandate. As
such, I doubt that the states parties will be amenable to a fundamental
reinterpretation that Burke-White concedes “may not have been envisioned by the drafters of the Rome Statute.”76 The ICC Prosecutor certainly does not share their views. Luis Moreno-Ocampo has stated publicly that the ICC will not involve itself in national trials, except to the
very limited extent of possible information-sharing if the safety of victims and witnesses can be assured.77
My most fundamental concern with these proposals is that they are
concerned primarily with how to make the ICC successful as an institution in promoting post-conflict justice. What I wish to do here is to return our attention to the core question of how the international legal
community as a whole can best promote the goals of post-conflict justice, whether through the ICC or some other way. When we focus upon
the goal of influencing and rebuilding national courts, as I argue we
should, there are better mechanisms for the international legal community to participate in these processes than the ICC or, for that mat73 See infra notes 233–318 and accompanying text.
74 See ICC, Report on the Activities of the Court, ¶¶ 66–71, delivered to the Sixth Session of the
Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/6/18 (Oct. 18, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 ICC Report], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-618_English.pdf; The Court’s Strategic Plan, Newsletter (ICC), Nov. 2006, at 4, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/files/ICC-NL6–200511_En.pdf.
75 Burke-White, supra note 2, at 98.
76 Id. at 76.
77 Group Meeting with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, ICC, at Human Rights Inst.,
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Wash., D.C. (Apr. 8, 2008).

26

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 50:1

ter, any international or hybrid court. This is not to say that the ICC has
no role to play in post-conflict justice, but rather, that it should not be
trying to play this role. Most importantly, we should not be trying to
foist this role upon it in an attempt to mitigate its other weaknesses and
salvage its reputation, instead of focusing on how to best achieve our
ultimate aims.
Thus, I am not convinced that the ICC should reorient itself toward influencing national courts, even if it could. Importantly, in spite
of their early favor for models centered on direct intervention by the
ICC, in the end both Burke-White and Turner suggest that it is through
transnational networks that the ICC might most effectively purvey its
influence.78 I am not in accord with their prescriptions for retooling
the ICC or their emphasis on a central role for that institution as opposed to other international actors. Nonetheless, I build upon their
descriptions of dynamic, multilevel relationships between national
courts and international actors, particularly insofar as they look beyond
the ICC to the roles of international institutions and transnational networks.
For although the early refocusing of attention on the role of hybrid courts was welcome, those considering this issue may have dismissed national courts too quickly and defined the potential mechanisms of international influence too narrowly by focusing on the hybrid
court context. The recent trials in military courts in the DRC have been
affected by the ICC, but through relatively indirect lines of influence, in
particular, through the intervention of international institutions and
transnational networks. The Rome Statute and associated ICC documents have created content to be transferred, and the ICC’s activities
have raised consciousness of the need for and possibility of criminal
trials for atrocities. From there, international institutions and transnational networks have taken up the task of transferring this information
to local actors, persuading them it is important, and providing the necessary assistance to enable them to use it.
These views provide a jumping-off point for the remainder of this
Article. For while hybrid courts provide one institutional structure for
interactions between international and national actors, there are other
hybrid mechanisms by which such interaction could take place.

78 Burke-White, supra note 2, at 98; Turner, supra note 34, at 990.
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II. Transnational Interaction in the DRC
A. Post-Conflict Congo
In the last ten years, the DRC has been the site of horrific atrocities and virtually absolute impunity for those who committed them.79
There are no precise figures for the number of people who have died
since armed conflict began in eastern Congo in 1996, but a good estimate set the death toll at 3.9 million as of 2004, with tens of thousands continuing to die each month—and these are just the dead, not
the many injured, ill, and displaced.80 This conflict, dubbed “Africa’s
World War,” is the deadliest since World War II.81
79 A note on my research method: I visited the DRC on a research trip in June and July
2006. While there, I attended private meetings and public programs held by representatives of national governments and international organizations; conducted formal interviews with representatives of the Congolese government, foreign governments, international organizations, and local nongovernmental organizations; had informal discussions
with representatives of these groups and with members of the public; and gathered documents, ranging from case judgments to laws to brochures, that are not available outside
the Congo and, in some instances, not publicly available within the country.
My initial contacts were selected for their expertise in some aspect of the Congolese
legal system or post-conflict justice and for their accessibility through personal contacts.
Further informants were selected in the field using a purposive sampling approach, on the
basis of their potential to add new information or perspectives to my understanding of the
system. This approach can be particularly effective for research such as this, in which the
goal is to obtain information and insights from knowledgeable individuals concerning the
technical aspects of a complex social system like the courts. My choice of informants was
limited by their availability during the volatile pre-election period of summer 2006 and by
their willingness to speak to me about such a sensitive subject.
Of course, there is always a risk of selection bias in the choice of informants for any
study. Here, I was more successful in obtaining interviews and documentary information
from representatives of international and foreign organizations than from representatives
of the Congolese government and legal community, although I met with members of all of
these communities. By triangulating interview, observation, and documentary information
from multiple international, foreign, and domestic sources, I have attempted to mitigate
this emphasis on foreign sources as much as possible. This difficulty, I think, illustrates a
widespread but often unacknowledged problem in the field of post-conflict justice and in
the relevant scholarship: foreign participants and observers often lack detailed information about national and local views.
All meetings were conducted in French or English. Because of the sensitivity of this
subject matter, some informants requested anonymity and are not identified herein. My
informants do not endorse my analysis or my conclusions, nor are they responsible for any
errors I may have made.
80 See generally Benjamin Coghlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A
Nationwide Survey, 367 Lancet 44 (2006).
81 Anne Penketh, Rwanda Threatens to Reignite Africa’s Bloodiest Conflict, Independent,
Dec. 17, 2004, at 23; Simon Robinson & Vivienne Walt, The Deadliest War in the World, Time,
June 5, 2006, at 38.
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The first war in Congo began as a foreign-supported rebel movement to overthrow longtime President Mobutu Sese Seko in 1996. After
that rebellion succeeded, eastern Congo resurged into a second war,
characterized by an explosion of militia fighting driven by funding and
troops from six neighboring countries. This militia warfare has never
been entirely quelled. Fighting continues in eastern Congo today despite a 1999 peace agreement, a 2002 power-sharing agreement, the
2006 democratic elections of a national legislature and president, and
the presence of the world’s largest UN peacekeeping force, Mission des
Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (“MONUC”).82
Among the numerous causes of Congo’s two wars and ongoing
conflict, at least three are critical for understanding the dynamics in the
country. These three factors have operated synergistically to escalate
the scale and intensity of the violence in the country and to undermine
the capacity of government institutions to suppress that violence or address its consequences. The Congo contains a vast wealth of mineral
resources in copper, cobalt, coltan, diamonds, and gold, which has long
made it an attractive target for intervention by foreign powers and for
violence and graft by domestic actors.83 Within the country, former
President Mobutu’s thirty-year kleptocratic reign universalized corrupt
acquisition of personal wealth as the mechanism of governance at the
cost of any development of institutions or infrastructure.84 And finally,
from outside the DRC, the genocide in Rwanda spurred the flight of
millions of refugees and genocidaires into eastern Congo and the
Rwandan army’s consequent incursions into eastern Congo in the mid1990s.85
What is important to understand, for our purposes, are certain
critical consequences of this history that will render any effort to
achieve justice for the attacks suffered by civilians inevitably inadequate
and incomplete: (1) the ubiquity of the atrocities that characterized the
82 See generally GlobalRights.org, Global Rights in Democratic Republic of Congo ( June
2006), http://www.globalrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=www_afr_index_41; International Crisis Group, Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1174 (last visited Sept. 27, 2008); Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF in
Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/countries/africa/
democraticrepublicofcongo/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
83 Robert B. Edgerton, The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo,
at xiv, 158 (2002).
84 See id. at 198, 213–15.
85 See id. at 219–20. See generally Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story
of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (1998); Michela Wrong, In the
Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo
(2001).
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war and that continue in the ongoing conflict;86 (2) the virtually universal impunity thus far for those who perpetrated those atrocities;87 (3)
the limited capacity of both the national and international legal systems
to address these atrocities;88 (4) the deep suspicion in the DRC of foreign motives for any proposed involvement in Congolese affairs;89 and
(5) the similarly strong distrust among the Congolese people of domestic government institutions.90
In practical terms, these obstacles will prevent justice from being
achieved for all, or even a substantial proportion of, the wrongs done in
Congo’s conflict. Fundamentally, the scale of the atrocities and the
number of victims are too great. Beyond this, the intervening time and
chaos have obliterated crucial details and evidence and have permanently separated perpetrators from their victims and from the scenes of
their crimes. Where perpetrators can be found, some are shielded from
arrest or prosecution by political and military leaders.91 On an institutional level, the national civilian courts were decimated by the war and
barely exist at all outside urban areas,92 and neither the international
nor the national justice systems have the capacity to take on more than
a few cases.93 Finally, neither the international nor the national justice

86 Robinson & Walt, supra note 81; Vivienne Walt & Andrew Purvis, Starving in a Land
of Plenty, Time Int’l, Apr. 3, 2006, at 20.
87 Executive Summary, What Justice Is There for Vulnerable Groups in Eastern DRC?, SOS Justice (Global Rights, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2005, at 6–8 [hereinafter SOS Justice], available at http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/SOS_ExecutiveSummary_ENG_FIN.pdf;
Interview with Anonymous G in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( June 27, 2006) [hereinafter G
Interview] (notes and contact information on file with author).
88 SOS Justice, supra note 87, at 6–8; see supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text
(concerning international system).
89 Paule Bouvier & Pierre Englebert, Congo’s Implausible Democracy, Foreign Pol’y, July
2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3535.
90 Id.
91 MONUC Human Rights Div., U.N., The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) During the Period of January to June 2006, at
11–12 (2006) [hereinafter June 2006 MONUC Report], available at http://www.monuc.
org/downloads/HRD_6_month_2006_report.pdf; MONUC Human Rights Div., U.N.,
The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) During
the Period of June to December 2006, at 21–22 (2007) [hereinafter Dec. 2006 MONUC
Report], available at http://www.monuc.org/downloads/HRR_6Month_Eng.pdf; G Interview, supra note 87; Interview with Marc LaRoche, Program Dir., Global Rights, in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( July 5, 2006) [hereinafter LaRoche Interview] (notes on file
with author).
92 SOS Justice, supra note 87, at 6–8.
93 See id.; Marlise Simons, Congo Warlord’s Case Is First for International Criminal Court,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2006, at A9.
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systems have the confidence of the Congolese people.94 It is in this context that Congolese prosecutors brought the three cases described below.
B. An Illustration: The Rome Statute in Three Domestic Cases
In this Section, I discuss three atrocity trials held in domestic
Congolese courts. In the first two cases, the courts used the Rome
Statute directly in lieu of national legal standards. In each instance, by
applying the Rome Statute, the national court substantially improved
upon the standards that would have been applied under national law
by bringing the rules used in these trials into better accord with
widely recognized substantive and due process standards. In the third
case, in which domestic law was applied, there was at least one fundamental due process violation that could have been prevented by
resort to the provisions of the Rome Statute.
The use of the Rome Statute in these cases is not the only way in
which international law and international actors affected these and
other cases in the Congo. It is, however, the most obvious and tangible
way. As such, these examples offer the opportunity to begin this discussion of the interaction between national and international actors with a
discrete, readily identifiable set of issues, focusing solely on the laws applied in each case and on the effect those laws had on the judgments.
1. The Cases
In each of the three cases discussed here, armed militia deliberately targeted a civilian town in eastern Congo for attack and widespread theft, rape, and/or killings.95 All of the attacks took place between 2003 and 2005, well after peace had been declared and also after
94 Interview with Anonymous F in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( June 27, 2006) [hereinafter F Interview] (notes and contact information on file with author); Global Rights Meeting, in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( June 26, 2006); see also Global Rights, La Justice
Protège Vos Droits: Qu’en Dit le Programme de Votre Candidat? 1 (2006), available at
http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/DRC_Policital_Parties_Guide.pdf.
95 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 7–11; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 6; Katamisi
case, supra note 11, at 6. The choice of cases discussed here was determined by relevance
and availability. I obtained these three judgments during a research trip to Kinshasa in
June and July 2006. This is not easy to do: the judgments are not published, nor is information necessarily made publicly available about them in the course of the trial. I found
out about the cases described here through a series of personal contacts and interviews
with members of the UN, NGOs, and others in Kinshasa, and I obtained copies of them
through personal contacts as well.
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the DRC ratified the Rome Statute in 2002.96 In one of the cases, the
defendants were soldiers enlisted in the DRC army;97 in the others, they
were members of nongovernmental militias.98
In many respects, these cases are entirely typical of the crimes occurring in Congo. Such attacks have long been and continue to be
commonplace. In June 2006, MONUC reported that “[t]he routine use
of physical violence against civilians, including summary executions,
beatings and rape, committed by FARDC soldiers . . . is reported wherever the army is deployed”99 and that killings, rapes, and abductions of
civilians by armed militias likewise “continue unabated” in the contested regions of the country.100
The sense in which these cases are extraordinary is that someone
is being tried at all. MONUC’s human rights reports recount a litany
of failed efforts to secure prosecution of suspects for such crimes,
punctuated by these occasional successes. In case after case, prosecutors refuse to open investigations or military commanders decline to
execute arrest warrants, so that suspects remain at large. Where arrests are made, trials are delayed or suspended. MONUC attributed
this recalcitrance “mainly to undue external interference, but also to
the lack of will, resources and capacity.”101 It contends that “the increase of open interference in judicial matters by political and military actors . . . is the result of a worrying superciliousness on the part
of these actors, who know that they can openly disregard the law in
absolute impunity.”102 Similarly, news reports describe “rampant political interference.”103 Observers allege that recent acquittals and
overturned convictions are products of this political pressure.
Each of these trials was heard by a military court, not a civilian
one.104 Under the justice system actually at work in the DRC now, these
96 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 8; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 4; Katamisi case,
supra note 11, at 6.
97 See Massaba case, supra note 11, at 1.
98 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 7; Katamisi case, supra note 11, at 5.
99 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 2; see also Dec. 2006 MONUC Report,
supra note 91, at 13–17, 19–20.
100 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 10; see also Dec. 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 17–20.
101 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 12.
102 See id. at 11–12; see also Dec. 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 17–20; G Interview, supra note 87.
103 Lisa Clifford, Military Court Trials Worry Activists, Inst. for War & Peace Reporting,
Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=338941&apc_state=henfacr338943.
104 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 1; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 1; Katamisi case,
supra note 11, at 1.
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military courts are currently functioning as national courts for many
purposes, and thus I treat them as such for the purpose of assessing international-national interactions. In a formal sense, these courts have
certain crucial characteristics that permit this treatment, including: (1)
the codification of the relevant crimes and procedural rules as national
law;105 (2) the courts’ status as a permanent system of military justice,
rather than as special military tribunals;106 and (3) the exclusivity and
comprehensiveness of the military courts’ jurisdiction over these
crimes: that is, the military courts have exclusive jurisdiction over war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide and over both civilians
and members of the military who commit these crimes.107
In addition to these formal elements, the military courts are also
the functioning national system in actuality. The civilian courts are not
operating at all in vast parts of the country.108 Moreover, crimes against
humanity and war crimes are commonplace in the parts of the country
still in conflict and arguably constitute the predominant problem of
criminal law there.109 Additionally, many acts of sexual violence were
not incorporated into the civilian criminal code until 2006 and thus
were recognized solely in the context of these international crimes under the jurisdiction of the military courts.110 Finally, the military courts
are seen by many as being more trustworthy and effective than the civilian courts, where the civilian courts are operating at all.111
Thus, in this context, for the purpose of examining the interactions between international and domestic actors and international and
national law, I treat the military courts as the domestic system, because
they are both formally and functionally performing as such. In so doing, however, I do not advocate for such equivalence in other contexts,
105 Code Judiciaire Militaire, art. 76, Loi No. 023/2002 of Nov. 18, 2002, Journal Officiel, Numéro Spécial [Official Journal, Special Issue], Mar. 20, 2003 (Dem. Rep. Congo)
(granting jurisdiction to military courts over all infractions of the Code Pénal Militaire);
Code Pénal Militaire, arts. 164–66, 173–75, Loi No. 024/2002 of Nov. 18, 2002, Journal
Officiel, Numéro Spécial [Official Journal, Special Issue], Mar. 20, 2003 (Dem. Rep. Congo)
(defining crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes).
106 Code Judiciaire Militaire, supra note 105, arts. 1–2.
107 Id. art. 76 (granting jurisdiction to military courts over all infractions of the Code
Pénal Militaire); Code Pénal Militaire, supra note 105, arts. 164–66, 173–75 (defining
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes). This has, unsurprisingly,
been the subject of criticism. See June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 2, 12.
108 SOS Justice, supra note 87, at 8.
109 See id. at 9.
110 Code Pénal, arts. 167–74, Loi No. 06/018 of Jul. 20, 2006, Journal Officiel,
Numéro Spécial [Official Journal, Special Issue], Aug. 1, 2006 (Dem. Rep. Congo).
111 Clifford, supra note 103 (quoting Harriet Solloway, Director of MONUC’s Rule of
Law Unit); F Interview, supra note 94.
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nor do I endorse the use of military courts for these purposes rather
than civilian ones. Indeed, as will become clear later, even in this context the use of military courts raises questions concerning the channeling of international resources.112
a. The Massaba Case
Blaise Bongi Massaba was a captain in the DRC army.113 He and
the soldiers in his command were deployed in Ituri, one of the eastern
provinces of the DRC. Intense fighting and atrocities took place in Ituri
throughout the two wars, and many nongovernmental armed militias
have continued to operate in Ituri since then. Attacks on civilians are
commonplace and brutal. Massaba and his troops were sent to patrol
and secure an assigned area with the purpose of suppressing the militia
activity there.114
On October 12, 2005, Massaba and his troops arrested five boys,
mostly students. Massaba and his cohort then went to a town in their
patrol area, Tchekele, and stole a motorcycle, a radio, a motorized
pump, and solar panels, among other things. Massaba forced the boys
to carry the stolen goods to his command post and then ordered his
troops to kill them on the pretext that they were militia members.115
Massaba was prosecuted in an Ituri military court for the war
crimes of murder and pillage. The court chose to apply the Rome Statute instead of national law on war crimes and convicted Massaba of
both charges. It sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered him
to pay $300,000 in damages to the families of the murdered boys.116

112 Of course, military courts cannot be treated as commensurate with civilian courts
in other respects, for example, for purposes of examining the details of trial procedure or
adjudication, which might well differ as between the two. But I am concerned here with
the interaction between international and domestic actors. Because the military courts are
the sole venue for atrocity trials in the DRC, they are also the sole venue for transnational
interactions concerning those trials. See Code Judiciaire Militaire, supra note 105, art.
76. In contrast, the proposed implementing legislation for the Rome Statute would give
jurisdiction to the civilian courts, amending the ordinary criminal code to include these
crimes. See Commission Permanente de Réforme du Droit Congolais, Avant projet
de loi portant mise en oeuvre du Statut de la Cour Pénale Internationale 16
(2003) [hereinafter Avant projet de loi].
113 Massaba case, supra note 11, at 1.
114 Id. at 4–6.
115 Id. at 5–6. There is a discrepancy in the judgment as to whether five or six boys were
kidnapped and killed. See id.
116 Id. at 6–7, 18–19.
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b. The Ngoy Case
The defendants in this case were members of the MLC nongovernmental militia.117 They had made their defensive headquarters
near the town of Songo Mboyo for about five years, and they had
grown accustomed to living off of the local population during that
time. The DRC has been working to integrate militias into its regular
army, and shortly before this incident took place, the local commander announced that these units of the MLC were to be integrated
into the Congolese army. Consequently, the soldiers would be moved
to a new location, far from the compliant population of Songo
Mboyo. They would also receive a pay raise that would increase their
pay by five times. The commander did not pay the soldiers promptly,
however, and instead held their money after collecting it from the
army’s agent. On December 21 and 22, 2003, frustrated that they had
not received the money owed to them, the militia members rebelled
against their commander. They attacked him and then went to Songo
Mboyo, stole a large amount of personal and commercial property,
and raped thirty-one women.118
Lieutenant Eliwo Ngoy and eleven co-defendants were prosecuted
in a Mbandaka military court for crimes against humanity for the sexual assaults, as well as for various crimes relating to their military insubordination under the Congolese military penal code.119 Like the Ituri
court, the Mbandaka court chose to apply the Rome Statute instead of
national law for the crimes against humanity charges.120 The court convicted seven of the defendants of crimes against humanity under the
Rome Statute and sentenced them to life imprisonment.121 The court
also ordered the convicted defendants to pay damages of $5,000 to sur-

117 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 7.
118 Id. at 8–11.
119 Id. at 1, 12. The other military crimes included military conspiracy, inciting the taking of arms against a civilian population, insulting a superior, usurping command, mishandling of arms, misuse of war munitions, and pillage. Id. at 4. It is not clear why pillage
was charged only as a military crime in this case, rather than as a war crime under the
Rome Statute as in the Massaba case. See id. at 12; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 10, 18.
120 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 12.
121 Id. at 4, 26. Five of the seven defendants who were convicted of crimes against humanity were also convicted of pillage under the Congolese military penal code and sentenced to twenty year terms of imprisonment. Some defendants were acquitted and others
convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment on the other national charges. Id. at
37–38.
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viving rape victims and $10,000 to the families of deceased rape victims.122
c. The Katamisi Case
Kalonga Katamisi, Sdt. Alimasi, and their unidentified accomplices were members of the Mayi-Mayi militia. In 2004, the defendants
kidnapped and raped ten women from the town of Kamanga. Katamisi held one of the kidnapped women captive as his “wife” for three
months.123
In contrast to the Massaba and Ngoy cases, charges were brought
against these defendants only under the Congolese Military Penal Code
rather than under the Rome Statute. The Kindu military court that
heard these cases did not even consider applying international law.
Only Katamisi was present at the trial; the others were still at large and
were tried in absentia. Indeed, remarkable as it sounds, except for Alimasi, the other defendants were not only absent, but unidentified. In
spite of this, not only Katamisi but also Alimasi and the unidentified
accomplices were all convicted of crimes against humanity under the
Congolese Military Penal Code, sentenced to death, and ordered to pay
$20,000 in damages to three of the rape victims who brought claims in
a related action.124
2. Effects of the Rome Statute
As is evident from these cases, there are two overlapping legal
frameworks for prosecuting crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
genocide in the DRC: an international framework and a national one.
In the Massaba and Ngoy cases, the courts chose international law for
these crimes, while in the Katamisi case, the court applied solely national law. Even before delving into the cases in any detail, it should be
obvious from the summaries above that the court using national law in
the Katamisi case chose a starkly different punishment—the death
penalty—and permitted a serious due process violation by allowing defendants to be tried not only in absentia but without being identified.
Would the use of international law have made a difference in this case?
As described below, I believe so. Of course, there is a limit to what can
be gleaned about a case from the judgment alone. My conclusions are
122 Id. at 38–40.
123 Katamisi case, supra note 11, at 5, 6.
124 Id. at 1–2, 5, 8–9.
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of necessity limited to these aspects of the cases, and I am unable to
comment on aspects of the trial procedure or other matters that were
not discussed in the written judgments. Nonetheless, when we examine
information provided in the Ngoy and Massaba judgments, the use of
international law seems to have made some positive difference.
First, a brief summary of the competing legal frameworks: on the
international level, the Rome Statute defines the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes for cases before the International Criminal Court.125 By ratifying the treaty, states parties do not
adopt those definitions but rather, agree to cooperate with the court.
They also create a nexus whereby the court might choose to exercise its
jurisdiction.126 The DRC ratified the Rome Statute in March 2002, but
has not yet passed implementing legislation.127 On the national level,
the DRC’s military penal code contains its own definitions of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes, which overlap to some extent
with the Rome Statute’s definitions but also differ in significant ways.128
There are three primary areas in which the effects of the Rome
Statute can be seen in the Ngoy and Massaba cases: in the adoption of
international definitions of crimes and punishments, in the use of international due process standards, and in the creation of protections
125 Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5–8.
126 Id. art. 86.
127 Décret-loi No. 00/3/2000 of Mar. 30, 2002 (Dem. Rep. Congo); Olympia Bekou &
Sangeeta Shah, Realising the Potential of the International Criminal Court: The African Experience, 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 499, 502 (2006); E-mail from Anonymous G to Elena Baylis [author] (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Feb. 19 E-mail] (on file with author).
128 See Code Pénal Militaire, supra note 105, arts. 164–66, 173–75. Although the DRC
also has an amnesty law for crimes committed during the period of hostilities, it is not
applicable here because it is limited to crimes committed between August 1996 and July
2003 and because it does not apply to genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.
MONUC Human Rights Div., U.N., The Human Rights Situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) During the Period of April to December 2005, at 11
(2006) [hereinafter Dec. 2005 MONUC Report], available at http://www.monuc.org/
downloads/MONUC_human_rights_2005_en.pdf. Curiously, the alternative definitions in
DRC national law post-date the DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute: they originated in
September 2002 legislation amending the military penal code. See Code Pénal Militaire,
supra note 105, arts. 164–66, 173–75. The reasons for this development are mysterious.
Since then, the DRC has floated successive drafts of legislation that would implement the
Rome Statute’s definitions of crimes and many of its other substantive provisions, so it does
not appear that the military penal code legislation was intended either to implement or to
supplant the Rome Statute. Bekou & Shah, supra note 127, at 502, 509–11; Interview with
Anonymous J in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( June 29, 2006) [hereinafter J Interview]
(notes and contact information on file with author). The best explanation for why this
occurred, strange as it seems, appears to be that the contradictory provisions were simply
overlooked.
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for victims and witnesses. The presence of these developments in the
Massaba and Ngoy cases and their absence in the Katamisi case (in
which domestic law was used) suggest avenues for international law to
play a constructive role in domestic atrocity trials.
a. International Definitions
In both the Massaba and Ngoy cases, the courts convicted the defendants of crimes under the Rome Statute, adopting its definitions of
crimes, as well as its rules of procedure and evidence.129 ICC observers
have suggested that the Rome Statute might be a vehicle for developing
the substance of international criminal law and have particularly noted
the Rome Statute’s progressive rules on sex crimes.130 The Ngoy case
fulfills these expectations. Under national law, the definition of the underlying act of rape for purposes of a charge of crimes against humanity was apparently quite narrow, including only certain acts committed
against women.131 In contrast, the Rome Statute’s definition is broader,
encompassing various forms of sexual assault against both genders.132
The Ngoy court applied the Rome Statute’s definition to draw in some
assaults that would otherwise have been excluded.133
Also, the courts in the Massaba and Ngoy cases adopted not only
the definitions of crimes but also other aspects of the Rome Statute in
lieu of national law.134 This had a substantial effect on sentencing, for
Congolese law provides for the death penalty for crimes against humanity, but under the Rome Statute defendants cannot be sentenced
to death.135 Accordingly, in the Massaba and Ngoy cases the death
penalty was not on the table; in the Katamisi case, in contrast, the defendants were sentenced to death.136 In this respect, as in the area of
sex crimes, the adoption of the Rome Statute advanced the growing

129 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 26–38; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 11–12.
130 E.g., William W. Burke-White, The International Criminal Court and the Future of Legal
Accountability, 10 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 195, 200–01 (2003).
131 It is not clear from the judgment exactly which acts are included in the national
definition of rape. See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 27, 32.
132 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(g).
133 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 26–28.
134 See id. at 4, 12, 38; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 11–12.
135 Code Pénal Militaire, supra note 105, art. 169; Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.
77.
136 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 12, 38; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 12, 18; Katamisi
case, supra note 11, at 9.
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international consensus on a substantive issue: the abolition of the
death penalty even for the most serious of crimes.137
However, the Congolese courts’ adoption of the Rome Statute’s
sentencing provisions also raises another fundamental justice issue:
disparate sentencing. This problem is familiar from the ad hoc international tribunals. In Rwanda, until 2007, defendants tried in national
courts could be sentenced to death, but defendants tried in the international tribunals could not.138 This disparity was particularly acute because the defendants in the international tribunals tended to be among
the most serious perpetrators.139 Here also, the difference in sentences
among these cases is due not to a difference in the severity of the
crimes but, rather, to the application of international rather than national law.140
In the same vein, ICC supporters also hoped that the existence of
the Rome Statute would promote common universal definitions of the
crimes it addresses.141 Here, the courts’ use of the Rome Statute promotes development of common, universal definitions of these crimes in
one sense but not in another. The use of the Rome Statute’s definitions
in the Ngoy and Massaba cases does of course extend the use of these
definitions into national law for the first time, thereby creating commonalities between international and national law where none existed
before. However, the use of the Rome Statute’s definitions is not universal among domestic courts, as evidenced by the Katamisi case. Accordingly, this increased convergence between international and national law comes at the cost of increased divergence within the law
applied domestically, as well as the risk of local uncertainty concerning
the applicable law.
137 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, http://www.
amnesty.org/en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Nov. 4,
2008); European Union Human Rights Policy, Abolition of the Death Penalty, http://ec.
europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/adp/index.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
138 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 77; William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 461, 479 (1997);
U.N. Welcomes Death Penalty Ban, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2007, at A6. The former Yugoslavia’s
criminal code also provided for the death penalty, but it has since been abolished in the
splinter states. See Schabas, supra, at 478–79; Amnesty International, supra note 137.
139 Schabas, supra note 138, at 507–08; Robert D. Sloane, Sentencing for the “Crime of
Crimes”: The Evolving “Common Law” of Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 713, 719–20 (2007).
140 Compare Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 12, 38 (applying international law and sentencing the defendant to imprisonment), with Katamisi case, supra note 11, at 8–9 (applying
national law and sentencing the defendant to death).
141 Burke-White, supra note 130, at 204.
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b. Due Process Standards
One of the primary critiques of domestic courts, as discussed
above, is that they fail to maintain acceptable due process standards.
The judgments do not discuss in detail the procedures that were followed in these cases, so it is impossible to provide a complete assessment of this issue. Where the issue does arise in the Massaba judgment, the court’s use of the Rome Statute standards appears to have
brought this trial and conviction more in accord with due process
standards than it would have been under national law.142 In contrast,
in the Katamisi judgment, the court’s description of its procedures
raises fundamental due process questions that could have been resolved by resort to the procedures endorsed by the Rome Statute.143
Massaba was accused of war crimes for his role in pillaging and
ordering his troops to kidnap and kill schoolboys.144 There was, however, a gap in the national law on war crimes: the law did not state the
applicable penalty for war crimes.145 Because DRC law requires a punishment to be stated in advance for each crime, as do basic principles
of fairness to the accused (i.e., nulla poena sine lege), conviction and
punishment of the defendants under the national war crimes provisions would have placed the court in violation of both national and
international due process mandates.146 Faced with this “glaring omission” and persuaded that the intent of the legislature in drafting legislation prohibiting war crimes was surely not to leave such crimes unpunished, the court looked to the Rome Statute to fill this gap in the
national law and avoid the due process problem.147
In the Katamisi case, where national law was used, the court not
only tried Sdt. Alamisi in absentia for crimes against humanity for his
role in raping ten women, it also tried and convicted various unnamed

142 See Massaba case, supra note 11, at 11–12.
143 See Katamisi case, supra note 11, at 1–2.
144 Massaba case, supra note 11, at 5–7.
145 Id. at 11.
146 Code Pénal Militaire, supra note 105, art 2; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 11; see
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 23–24. But see Schabas, supra note 138, at 475–76 (arguing
that this is “a mechanical and ultimately exaggerated application of the nulla poena principle” due to the effective notice provided by the history of international criminal trials and
sentencing at and since Nuremburg).
147 Massaba case, supra note 11, at 11 (describing “une lacune criante”). However, as
discussed above, the court did not merely adopt the Rome Statute’s penalties as a gapfilling measure, but rather applied the Rome Statute and its rules of procedure and evidence to the case as a whole. Id. at 12–17.
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codefendants.148 Trials in absentia raise questions of due process even
when the identities of the defendants are known and they are simply
not present at the trial. To try and convict unknown, unnamed defendants violates any conceivable notion of the right to a fair trial and defense. The court does not discuss its decision to try the unnamed defendants in absentia in the judgment, so it is not clear whether trials in
absentia, of known or unknown defendants, are permissible under national law or are merely a vagary of this court’s procedure in this case.
Regardless, the Rome Statute does not permit trials in absentia, and so
the use of the international standard in this case would have precluded
such a gross due process violation.149
c. Protections for Victims
The Rome Statute offers extensive protections for victims and witnesses, including a Victims and Witnesses Unit tasked with undertaking
protective measures and security arrangements.150 The Statute calls for
particular attention to victim protection in cases of sexual assault, such
as use of in camera proceedings or alternative ways of presenting evidence as appropriate.151
In both the Massaba and Ngoy cases, the judgments refer to the
protections the Rome Statute offers for victims and witnesses as an advantage of the Statute over national law.152 In particular, the Ngoy court
followed the Rome Statute’s procedures in holding in camera sessions to
take testimony from rape victims.153 Furthermore, the court’s attitude
toward the victims’ testimony is strikingly sympathetic: the judgment
asserts that the effect of trauma and shame on the victims’ testimony
must be taken into account and should not be permitted to undermine
their veracity.154 The tendentious arguments put forward by the Ngoy
defendants seem to indicate that they expected a more skeptical approach to the victims’ testimony from the court.155 In contrast, in the
148 Katamisi case, supra note 11, at 1–2, 8–9.
149 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 63.
150 Id. art. 43(6).
151 Id. art. 68(2).
152 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 12; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 12.
153 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 3; June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 11;
G Interview, supra note 87.
154 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 27–28.
155 See id. at 29–30. In fact, some defendants took their efforts to discredit the victims
to the point of absurdity, arguing that a victim’s testimony that she had been raped by two
of them in succession could not be true because, according to her account, the lower
ranked soldier had raped her first. Id. In reality, the defendants argued, in such a situation
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Katamisi judgment, where national law was used, no mention is made of
any protections available for the rape victims, and Congolese law apparently does not provide for in camera hearings or other measures.156
3. Conclusions Concerning Effects
At least in these limited senses, therefore—focusing solely on
these three cases and on the use of the Rome Statute—the introduction of international law seems to have shown both noticeable and
positive effects.157 Although analyzing case law to understand the legal
standards set forth may seem like the most ordinary mode of analysis
imaginable, in this context it is actually rather startling that the opportunity to do so arises. For, as I outline below, in Section C of this
Part, the importation of the Rome Statute into this context, like the
other aspects of international influence upon post-conflict justice in
the Congo, was neither a simple process nor a foregone conclusion.158
These cases are, however, merely an illustration of one kind of
interaction between international and domestic legal systems. Thus,
my focus in this Section on the use of the Rome Statute in these cases
also stands in temporarily for a whole range of other effects that are
less marked and thus more difficult to enumerate and dissect. Accordingly, having grounded my analysis in this relatively tangible issue, in
the Sections that follow, I expand out from this example to consider
the higher ranked soldier would never have deferred to his subordinate but would have
pulled rank to rape the woman first—betraying a rather self-incriminating certainty of the
protocol of rape. See id. As one would expect, the court rejected this argument with indignation. See id.
156 See June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 11. See generally Katamisi case, supra note 11.
157 See June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 11 (identifying similar effects).
158 Indeed, from the few subsequent judgments I have been able to obtain, there appears to be an ongoing disparity within the DRC between the military courts in Ituri
(where there has been a great deal of international involvement in post-conflict justice and
where the courts appear to apply the Rome Statute as a matter of course in appropriate
cases) and those in other regions (where there has been far less involvement and where
the courts may or may not do so in any given case). Compare Auditeur Militaire v. Mulombo, No. RP 101/2006, RMP No 545/PEN/2006, slip op. at 40–41, Tribunal Militaire de
Garnison [Military Garrison Court] Ituri, Feb. 19, 2007 (Dem. Rep. Congo) [hereinafter
Mulombo case] (using the Rome Statute), with Auditeur Militaire Supérieur v. Ilunga,
Arrêt R.P. no. 010/2006, slip op. at 3, 15, Cour Militaire [Military Court] Katanga, June 28,
2007 (Dem. Rep. Congo) [hereinafter Ilunga case] (failing to make clear whether the
court is applying international or national law), with Auditeur Militaire Supérieur v.
Ekembe, Arrêt R.P. no. 011/2006, R.M.P. no. 0086/06/MW, slip op. at 2–3, Cour Militaire
[Military Court] Katanga, April 25, 2007 (Dem. Rep. Congo) [hereinafter Ekembe case]
(applying national law).
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the work of international and national actors in the Congo on atrocity
trials and post-conflict justice generally.
C. Mechanisms of Influence
Four major theories of international law—transnational legal
process, transgovernmentalism, legal pluralism, and policy-oriented
jurisprudence—provide frameworks for analyzing interactions between
international and national institutions. Although these four theories
vary substantially in their particulars and in their normative claims, they
share certain commonalities that can be taken as fundamental. They
reject formalist and positivist frameworks of international law and instead call upon us to look at a broader set of actions and actors for
lawmaking behavior. They also press us to consider that the production
of law may not be a straight line endeavor from legislation to enforcement but, rather, may develop over time in a more dynamic and decentralized fashion. In so doing, these theories urge us to a relatively thick
description of the process of interaction between international and national participants as a means of understanding the normative function
of this process. These insights are fundamental to the analysis in this
Section.159
Here, in the simplest sense, a national court system has voluntarily
adopted an international standard and deployed that standard in particular cases brought before it. By what process did this happen? What
were the conduits of influence that proved to be effective in this situation? The answers to these questions complicate this simple summary
statement considerably.
The DRC is exactly the sort of state that commentators expected
would adamantly resist participating in the Rome Statute treaty regime, precisely because it is rife with the kinds of atrocities that the
Rome Statute is intended to prevent and punish.160 Contrary to all
expectations, the DRC was not only one of the early states to ratify the
ICC’s Rome Statute, but it also self-referred the situation within its

159 See 1 Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free
Society 3–32 (1992) (policy-oriented jurisprudence); Berman, supra note 18, at 1159–64,
1168 (legal pluralism); Koh, supra note 16, at 184 (transnational legal process); Reisman et
al., supra note 17, at 577–80 (policy-oriented jurisprudence); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Real New World Order, 76 Foreign Aff. 183, 185 (1997) (transgovernmentalism).
160 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 92; Ratner, supra note 55, at 449, 452 (acknowledging the DRC as an exceptional ratification, but predicting that it would not turn over
defendants to the ICC).
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borders to the ICC for investigation and cooperated in turning over
the ICC’s first defendant to the court.161
Now, again contrary to expectations, the DRC has become an early
adopter of the Rome Statute domestically as well. Here, as in the past,
the Congolese courts’ unanticipated, voluntary adoption of the Rome
Statute as the rule of decision in some domestic cases requires us to
rethink our assumptions about how international law is drawn into
domestic contexts. As with the DRC’s ratification and self-referral, the
forces that influenced the courts to undertake these trials and to apply
the Rome Statute have taken a different course than commentators
predicted.
Observers expected the risk of prosecution to serve as a direct incentive to states to investigate and prosecute perpetrators in order to
avoid having the ICC assert its jurisdiction.162 Although the existence of
the ICC and its investigations in the Congo seem to have sparked
greater awareness of and interest in war crimes prosecutions in general,
the Congolese courts do not seem to be responding directly to the possibility that the ICC would indict these defendants in undertaking
prosecutions themselves.
Additionally, although those promoting national implementation
of the Rome Statute have pressed for legislatures to pass implementing legislation as the mechanism by which the Rome Statute will have
national effect,163 in the DRC, this development comes directly from
the courts. The military courts have adopted the Statute without the
benefit of implementing legislation—which is still in draft form—and
in lieu of competing national law also defining these crimes.
Furthermore, one of the most fundamental conduits for the development of international law—the use of case law, commentaries,
and other sources developing legal rules and analysis from the relevant
treaties—appears to have been virtually irrelevant. Neither of the courts
applying the Rome Statute makes extensive use of these sources in its
analysis.
161 See ICC April 2004 Press Release, supra note 60; Press Release, MONUC, Congolese
National Arrested for War Crimes in First Transfer to UN-Backed Court (Mar. 18, 2006),
available at http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=10350; Coal. for the ICC, States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC ( July 18, 2008), available at http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/RatificationsbyUNGroup_18_July_08.pdf; ICC, Democratic Republic of the
Congo (African States), http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/statesparties/country&id=5.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2008).
162 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17 (requiring the prosecutor to defer to genuine state investigations and prosecutions).
163 See Bekou & Shah, supra note 127, at 505–07.
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Finally, rather than being compelled by the legislature or the ICC
to apply the Statute, these courts seem to have been influenced by the
involvement of MONUC in investigating and pressing for prosecution
of these crimes, as well as by the work of NGOs and others. In particular, the dynamics of these investigations and prosecutions and the pattern of use of the Rome Statute and international law in court judgments suggest the influence of transnational networks. These networks
of international, foreign, national, and local actors not only advocate
for trials in general and for these trials in particular, they also actively
deliver information to the national courts that are trying cases.
In this Section, I provide a fairly detailed account of the roles of
four different players in the DRC domestic trials: the DRC legislature,
the jurisprudence of international courts, the International Criminal
Court, and networks of international organizations, NGOs, embassies
and others. What emerges is that the incorporation of the Rome Statute in the cases described above is not an isolated importation of international law by the domestic system. Rather, this development is embedded in multiple, overlapping international-national interactions
aimed at the more far-reaching goal of promoting post-conflict justice
by rebuilding the national justice system.
1. Legislature
Perhaps the most typical, and certainly the most straightforward
way by which the standards enumerated in the Rome Statute might
come to be deployed by a national court would be for the national
legislature to ratify the Statute and then to pass implementing legislation that the courts would then apply as national law.164 This did not
happen in the Congo. Instead, after the DRC ratified the Rome Statute, it did two contradictory things: it began developing and publicly
floating implementing legislation that is to this day still in draft
form,165 and it amended the national law on the same subjects to include provisions, including definitions of the relevant crimes, that are

164 Even in monist states, implementing legislation is required for treaties that are considered non-self-executing. Monist states such as Belgium have enacted implementing
legislation concerning the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. See 10 février 1999 Loi
relative à la répression des violations graves de droit international humanitaire, M.B. 23
mars 1999, p. 9286 (Belg.).
165 Avant projet de loi, supra note 112, at 2; Bekou & Shah, supra note 127, at 509–
11.

2009]

Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks

45

not the same as those in the Rome Statute.166 In practice, this has created a condition of legal pluralism in the DRC, in which jurists must
choose whether to apply the provisions in the Code Pénal Militaire or
those in the Rome Statute, with some choosing the one and some
choosing the other.167 The choice of the Rome Statute is not clearly
correct when analyzed in the context of the choices made by other
states parties in implementing the Statute. Nonetheless, as discussed
below, it does have one important and, in my view, positive consequence: it tends to promote greater implementation of the treaty in
situations like the Congo’s in which it can be put to effective use.
One might reasonably ask whether the dual approach to this
question in the DRC is true pluralism or mere error. After all, states
typically have rules defining which of various legal enactments shall
take precedence in the event that they conflict. Here, the answer is
not entirely clear. The DRC, like many civil law countries, is monist,
and its constitution provides that treaties take precedence over ordinary laws.168 It would seem to be easy enough, then, to conclude that
the Rome Statute’s provisions are directly applicable within the DRC
and must take precedence over the subsequently enacted Code de
Justice Militaire. The courts adopting the Rome Statute here cite to
this constitutional provision in support of their decisions.169
In so doing, however, the Congolese courts stand at odds with the
other states parties to the Statute, as well as the conclusions of scholars
166 Compare, for example, the provisions on crimes against humanity of the Code de
Justice Militaire, supra note 105, arts. 165–72, with those of the Rome Statute, supra note
1, art. 7.
167 Compare Massaba case, supra note 11, at 10–12, with Katamisi case, supra note 11, at
8. At least those who are aware of the pluralism must choose. The decision in the Katamisi
case gives no indication whether the judge considered applying the Rome Statute. See
Katamisi case, supra note 11, at 8. In light of the practical difficulties of disseminating legal
information discussed below, it is certainly possible that some judges are not aware of the
relevance of the provisions of the Rome Statute. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
168 Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo art. 215.
169 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 12; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 11–12. The DRC
Constitution does not contain a last in time rule; thus, treaties appear to trump even subsequent domestic legislation. See Constitution de la République Démocratique du
Congo art. 215; cf. Note, Conflicts Between Treaties and Subsequently Enacted Laws in Belgium:
Etat Belge v. S.A. “Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le Ski,” 72 Mich. L. Rev. 118, 126–27 (1973)
(stating that Belgian law accords treaties “having direct effect within the domestic legal
order” precedence over subsequently enacted legislation but applies a last in time rule to
other treaties). The prevailing opinion in the domestic legal community seems to be that it
is self-evident that the Rome Statute’s provisions should trump the subsequent domestic
codes. See, e.g., Interview with Alpha Fall, Senior Assoc., Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, in
Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( June 28, 2006) [hereinafter Fall Interview] (notes on file
with author).
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who have considered the subject. States parties and commentators alike
have uniformly understood the Rome Statute to be non-self-executing,
at least with regard to its definitions of crimes and related provisions.170
Indeed, by ratifying the Rome Statute, states parties do not expressly
take on the obligation to adopt and enforce its norms, but only to cooperate with the ICC.171 As noted in a scholarly discussion of Belgium’s
rule on non-self-executing criminal treaties, this is particularly important in the criminal law context in light of the nullem crimen, nullem
poena sine lege principle.172 As such, one would expect the DRC to follow
the practice followed by Belgium and other monist countries concerning non-self-executing treaties and to find the Rome Statute unenforceable domestically absent implementing legislation.
Furthermore, if the treaty is self-executing and trumps subsequent
domestic legislation, then it is difficult to imagine what the DRC legislature could accomplish by proposing implementing legislation that includes provisions concerning the definitions of crimes and related issues. If the Rome Statute is self-executing, then to the extent that this
legislation duplicates those provisions, it is redundant, and to the extent that it diverges from them, it is ineffective.173
In light of these countervailing considerations, it may seem that
the Congolese courts have no support for their position. It is true that
the Congolese courts’ approach does appear to put them in a worldwide minority of one. Nonetheless, if we take the constitutional provision at face value and presume that the DRC is simply at the extreme
among monist countries in treating all international treaties as selfexecuting, then the courts’ decisions were correct as a matter of domestic constitutional law.174 Furthermore, as a matter of international
170 See, e.g., Criminal Law Section, Commonwealth Expert Group, Report of the
Commonwealth Expert Group on Implementing Legislation for the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court ¶ 3 (2004), available at http://www.thecommon
wealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BF3BC7D68-4922-4B35-A14E-ED26AECA8
6 F5%7D_FINAL%20REPORT-%20london%20ICC.pdf; Marco Roscini, Great Expectations:
The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Justice 493, 494 (2007);
Turner, supra note 2, at 8.
171 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 86.
172 Damien Vandermeersch, Droit Belge, in Juridictions nationales et crimes internationaux 69, 70 (Antonio Cassese & Mirielle Delmas-Marty eds., 2002); see also Roscini,
supra note 170, at 494.
173 Of course, implementing legislation would serve the purpose of providing procedures for carrying out the state’s cooperation obligations. However, the draft legislation
also defines the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Avant projet de loi, supra note 112, at 16–24.
174 See Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo art. 215; Ngoy
case, supra note 11, at 12; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 11.
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law, it is hardly inappropriate for a state party’s courts to voluntarily deploy the Statute, even if they are not required to do so. At a minimum,
domestic use of the Rome Statute should promote its object and purpose of providing redress for atrocities. Also, because the courts in
question applied not only the Rome Statute itself, but also the ICC’s
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (thus providing considerable specificity) and because they have applied the Statute only to acts over which
the ICC itself would have jurisdiction if the domestic courts did not
prosecute (thus avoiding retrospective application of new criminal
rules and penalties), the nullem crimen, nullem poena sine lege concerns
mentioned above are substantially mitigated here.175
In the end, irrespective of the correctness of their decisions as a
matter of international or national law, the DRC courts have in fact
treated the Rome Statute as self-executing and applied it as the rule of
decision in these cases. The effect has been to leapfrog the legislature’s dilly-dallying over its implementing legislation and to internalize the international rule without modifications.
These are no small matters when considered in the context of the
theory and realities of importing international law into domestic contexts. By applying the Rome Statute directly without waiting for implementing legislation, the Congolese courts have demonstrated the possibility of extending the ICC’s range of influence to states that have
ratified but not implemented the treaty. This is particularly significant
for African states: a 2006 study found that although forty-two of the fifty
African states had either signed or ratified the treaty, only South Africa
had passed implementing legislation.176 In some states, of course, this
delay may be the result of substantive concerns; however, particularly in
transitional states like the DRC, where government institutions are
functioning only sporadically, it may simply reflect the legislature’s failure to act effectively.177
2. Jurisprudence
Another familiar mechanism through which international law is
transmitted is through the authoritative or persuasive interpretation of
provisions of international law in cases and commentaries. Accordingly,
one of the expectations for international courts has been that they
175 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 26–28; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 12; see Vandermeersch, supra note 172, at 70.
176 Bekou & Shah, supra note 127, at 501.
177 Id. at 501–05.
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would develop influential rules and standards through their case law.178
Here, however, the Massaba and Ngoy courts relied primarily on the
text of the Rome Statute itself, analyzing it directly rather than considering international case law or commentaries. The Massaba court did
not refer at all to prior rulings by the ad hoc international tribunals on
the issues raised, nor did it consider any of the numerous articles and
books commenting on the ad hoc tribunals and the International
Criminal Court, nor the travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute. Apart
from the Rome Statute itself, it makes use only of some general international law treatises predating the Statute.179 The Ngoy court also engaged primarily in direct analysis.180 Unlike the Massaba court judgment, the Ngoy judgment referred to some other sources, including a
Congolese treatise concerning the Rome Statute and a single case from
the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.181
The materials considered by the courts in their deliberations may
well have been determined by what is available, not by what might be
most useful or relevant.182 It is perhaps not a coincidence that MONUC
provided support for the Ngoy trial; such support has included briefings on relevant legal issues and provision of international legal materials.183 This conclusion is also supported by a pattern in a few subsequent judgments of repeated citation of certain international cases in
the Ituri courts, where MONUC and the EU have invested enormous
resources.184 In contrast, the courts in Katanga and other regions without such international support do not typically cite international cases,
if they use international law at all.185
Indeed, without such assistance, it is difficult to obtain case law and
other current international and foreign legal resources within the
178 See Turner, supra note 2, at 16.
179 Massaba case, supra note 11, at 9–10, 12–16.
180 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 26–27.
181 Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 34. The Ngoy court cites the Akayesu case only once for
the definition of a widespread or systematic attack but does no further analysis and makes
no other references to this case or any other international jurisprudence, leaving this citation as a curious one-off. See id.
182 See Massaba case, supra note 11, at 13 (citing Pietro Verri, Dictionary of the International Law of Armed Conflict (1988)).
183 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 18; F Interview, supra note 94; G Interview, supra note 87; E-mail from Anonymous G to Elena Baylis [author] (Feb. 18, 2008)
[hereinafter Feb. 18 E-mail] (on file with author).
184 See, e.g., Auditeur Militaire v. Kahwa, No. RP 039/2006, RMP 227/PEN/2006, slip
op. at 26–27, Tribunal Militaire de Garnison [Military Garrison Court] Ituri, Aug. 2, 2006
(Dem. Rep. Congo) [hereinafter Kahwa case] (containing citations to international cases).
185 See generally Ilunga case, supra note 158 (lacking citations to international cases).
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DRC.186 Cases, laws, treatises, and other legal materials are not often
published domestically or imported from abroad. Legal research can
resemble detective work, requiring the researcher to hunt down leads
on where copies of judgments or laws might be found. Even in Kinshasa,
where Internet service is widely available, it is unreliable and slow, and
there is a dearth of legal materials in print as well. In a study sponsored
by the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”), the judges
of the DRC Supreme Court said that the difficulty of obtaining copies of
laws and judgments posed a significant problem for them—all the more
so for trial judges in isolated Ituri and Mbandaka.187
It would be easy to lightly dismiss this as a pragmatic question of
implementation, but to do so would be a mistake. This problem
brings into focus one of the crucial factors determining how international courts can influence domestic trials: the conduits available for
them to do so. Simply put, for the ICC to influence other tribunals
through its jurisprudence, that jurisprudence must be made available
to these other courts. Because many post-conflict states have similar
resource and infrastructure problems to those described here, it is not
sufficient solely to publish opinions in print or on the Internet.188
These mechanisms are simply not effective in states where print and
Internet media are not readily accessible. Rather, to ensure that any
such materials are available to courts in the DRC and similarly situated countries, it is necessary to obtain them outside the state in question and provide them directly to the involved judges and attorneys,
as the networks described below have done.189

186 During my field research in Kinshasa, I found it difficult to obtain copies even of
Congolese laws, much less foreign legal materials. When I went to the office in Kinshasa
that prints and sells the DRC laws and codes to obtain the laws cited in this Article, the
personnel there were able to provide only one: the ratification of the Rome Statute. The
others I had to obtain through foreign sources. For discussion of my research methods
generally, see supra note 79.
187 Interview with Fred Robarts, Gestionnaire du Projet Renforcement des Capacités
de Règlement des Contentieux Electoraux, UNDP, in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( July 5,
2006) [hereinafter Robarts Interview].
188 In my experience, for example, Ethiopia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone each suffer
from similar problems at varying levels. See Widner, supra note 13, at 74, for additional
information.
189 This problem extends to all manner of logistics and can have a real effect on the
course of justice and legal reform. For example, when Global Rights was advocating legislation against sexual violence, it hit a roadblock: there was no printer ink available at the
legislature to print the proposed legislation for the parliamentarians. Global Rights supplied a print cartridge, and the law was eventually passed. LaRoche Interview, supra note
91.
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3. International Criminal Court
In their visions of how the International Criminal Court might
promote greater justice for atrocities, both William Burke-White and
Jenia Turner call for the ICC itself to be involved in domestic trials to
some extent.190 This would be a major shift in direction for the Court.
The ICC has not thus far played a direct role in the national trials in
the Congo, nor does it seem to have interacted with domestic institutions or systems in any significant way. Accordingly, the ICC’s influence
has been limited to setting some of the foundational but ultimately
background political and legal circumstances against which these trials
have taken place.
Here, it is important to distinguish between the International
Criminal Court as an institution and participation in the Rome Statute
treaty regime. Of course, the DRC’s ratification of the Rome Statute
laid the legal groundwork for the Congolese courts to apply the Statute
directly in these cases. Its participation in the treaty regime was thus a
prerequisite (albeit an insufficient one) for the direct application of
the Statute in domestic law. The substance of the legal rules provided
by the Rome Statute is, of course, at the heart of the effects on the
Massaba and Ngoy judgments described above. As a treaty, therefore,
the Rome Statute had an enormous effect upon these cases.
However, the ICC as an institution has not had the impact within
the DRC that supporters anticipated, either in kind or in degree. In
particular, it seems to have had only a general awareness-raising effect
and perhaps some political effect within the country. It does not seem
to have had any direct influence upon military prosecutors’ decisions
to bring particular charges against particular defendants or upon the
Congolese courts’ decision to make use of the Rome Statute in some
of those cases.
The ICC has made an effort to publicize its work in the DRC, and
certainly the Kinshasa international and domestic legal communities,
at least, are well aware of the ICC’s prosecutions. It is worth noting
that the results of this awareness-raising have not been entirely positive in nature, as public dissatisfaction with the ICC efforts seemed to
be high, from what I could gather as a firsthand observer. This is due
not only to the slowness with which the prosecutions have developed
but also the selectivity in defendants and in the charges against them,
which are perceived to be the result of political interference.191 None190 See Burke-White, supra note 2, at 56–58; Turner, supra note 2, at 30–35.
191 Madidi Interview, supra note 56.
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theless, it can be said that the existence of the ICC, the process of ratifying the Rome Statute and drafting implementing legislation, and
the investigations and cases the ICC is now pursuing all seem to have
raised public consciousness of the issue of prosecuting international
crimes in the DRC.192
William Burke-White has argued that this awareness has had fairly
wide-ranging effects on a political level. To some extent this may be
true. In other respects, however, increased consciousness of the ICC
and the crimes it prosecutes has had no apparent effect: for example,
awareness of the ICC does not seem to have deterred the atrocities that
rage on even now.193 If all that the ICC has accomplished is to ratchet
down the level of political opposition to holding atrocity trials by several notches, enough to enable trials at least of some defendants whose
prosecution does not pose any threat to or hold any interest for those
in power, this is a significant contribution. It is not, however, the sort of
central role that supporters have sought for the court.
The primary role that the ICC was expected to play in post-conflict
states parties was to spur domestic prosecution of known perpetrators
to avoid the perceived loss of face and sovereignty costs of having the
ICC pursue those prosecutions internationally.194 Contrary to predictions, however, the threat of ICC prosecution does not appear to have
played any direct role in spurring these or other domestic prosecutions
in the DRC. In particular, the military prosecutors do not appear to
have brought domestic cases in order to shield the defendants from
international prosecution under the Rome Statute’s complementarity
provisions. These defendants are all low level perpetrators like many
thousands of others, and thus are not of interest to the ICC.195 There is
also no evidence that Congolese authorities have made any effort to
make use of the complementarity provisions to shield more senior suspects like Lubanga, who are of concern to the ICC.
192 At a minimum, everyone with whom I spoke was aware of the ICC and the Lubanga
case. See, e.g., Fall Interview, supra note 169.
193 See Burke-White, Complementarity, supra note 62, at 587; Jeffrey Gettleman, Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2007, at A1.
194 See Burke-White, supra note 2, at 69.
195 See Ngoy case, supra note 11, at 1; Massaba case, supra note 11, at 1, 6. Indeed, one
criticism of the domestic prosecutions has been that they have only involved low level perpetrators rather than more senior suspects who have also been identified but have not
been arrested. As many suspects have easily evaded arrest or been cleared of charges under suspicious circumstances, the commonly held belief is that only those low enough in
the local hierarchy to be unable to protect themselves will be tried. See MONUC, Monthly
Human Rights Assessment: April 2007 ¶¶ 66–75 (May 17, 2007), http://www.monuc.org/
News.aspx?newsID=14592 [hereinafter MONUC April 2007 Assessment].
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Nor has the ICC as an institution involved itself in promoting or
supporting domestic cases in the DRC. Instead, the ICC has been involved in its own investigations in the Congo and in outreach activities
intended to publicize its work, but not in supporting or participating
in domestic efforts at achieving justice.196 The ICC’s reports on its activities describe investigations for the Lubanga case and for additional
cases to be heard in the ICC itself. They also describe outreach aimed
at informing the Congolese population about the Lubanga proceedings and educating it about the court and its procedures generally.
Some of this outreach has been directed at the Congolese legal community, but it has been targeted at informing this audience about the
ICC rather than at providing training on the relevant law, assistance
with domestic cases, or capacity-building of domestic institutions.197
Instead of playing a central role in domestic efforts at post-conflict
justice, the ICC’s contributions are dwarfed by those of others working
actively to build up the domestic legal system and support domestic
cases within the Congo. Unlike the other institutions and actors whose
work is described below, the ICC does not seem to have had any direct
influence either on the decisions to bring these particular cases or on
the domestic courts’ decision to make use of international law in them.
Unlike Burke-White and Turner, I am not convinced that this is
something to be decried. To the contrary, I am skeptical that a vast
reallocation of the ICC’s resources from its own investigations and
trials to support for national trials and interaction with national or
hybrid tribunals is either possible or wise. Of course, both the ICC
and national courts would likely benefit from some interchange. It
would be a positive step, for example, for the ICC to take steps to
channel its future jurisprudence to domestic judges working on similar cases. But it may well be best for the ICC to focus its energies on
what its institutional structure and mandate suggest that it should do:
investigating and trying cases and producing judgments and legal
opinions.198 It can thereby serve the useful if unglamorous purposes
196 See 2007 ICC Report, supra note 74, at 4–7.
197 See id. at 6–7; see also Outreach: Engaging Communities, Newsletter (ICC), Nov. 2006,
at 5, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/newsletter/files/ICC-NL6-200511_
En.pdf. This description is based on a complete review of the ICC’s newsletters and reports
to the Assembly of States Parties as of November 1, 2007, which are too numerous to cite
here. The cited documents are examples of those surveyed. In addition, the ICC’s Public
Information Officer in Kinshasa confirmed that the ICC’s activities in the DRC had been
limited to its own investigations and public outreach and education. Madidi Interview,
supra note 56.
198 See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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of serving as a backstop against the risk of total impunity for all atrocities and providing reputational and political incentives for domestic
actors to get out of the way of at least some national atrocity trials. It is
true that this will limit the ICC’s institutional role in post-conflict settings like the DRC, but that is not, in my view, inappropriate.
For limiting the ICC’s institutional role in post-conflict states is
not synonymous with limiting the international community’s investment and involvement in those states. Courts do not have an exclusive
claim on expertise in the activities and systems that are necessary to
bring justice for atrocities, nor are court personnel or bureaucracies
necessarily best suited to convey such expertise. Indeed, as discussed
below, not only are court-to-court relationships not the only international-national interactions that can promote the cause of justice in
post-conflict settings like the DRC, but other liaisons may in fact be
better at doing so. Due to the structural, bureaucratic, and other institutional limits on the kinds of activities the ICC can hope to take on,
the goals of post-conflict justice may best be served if the ICC focuses
on the more limited role that is its core function and relies on other
international actors to support national courts.
4. Networks of International Organizations, NGOs, and Others
Instead of the International Criminal Court, the legislature, or the
jurisprudence of international courts, what seems to have played the
most influential role in the development of these cases and the use of
the Rome Statute within them is formal and informal networking by
international and domestic actors. Some of this activity has been directly related to the trials in question, and some has indirectly shaped
the domestic legal environment. The situation here demonstrates several of the themes common to theories of transnational legal interactions such as transnational legal process, global governance, policyoriented jurisprudence, and legal pluralism: (1) that the actors who
influence the legal process will be not only those directly involved in
trials, but also other institutions and individuals, at both international
and domestic levels, governmental and nongovernmental; (2) that they
will interact not only within the formal legal process but also informally,
through institutions, and through networks; and (3) that their involvement will be iterative as well as singular.199
199 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 159, at 141–60 (policy-oriented jurisprudence); Berman, supra note 18, 1164–68 (global legal pluralism); Koh, supra note 16, at
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A central player in these networks has been MONUC’s Human
Rights Division (“HRD”), which has been intimately involved in the investigation and prosecution of international crimes in the DRC, including, among others, the Ngoy case.200 In language reminiscent of the
hyperbole of ICC supporters, MONUC’s website asserts that its HRD “is
to put an end to impunity and to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are
brought to justice.”201
Although these goals are undoubtedly too lofty, there is no doubt
that MONUC has played a substantial role both in moving these cases to
trial and in promoting the use of international law within them. In 2002,
the HRD organized a Special Investigations Unit that investigates massive human rights violations.202 This Unit does not simply conduct the
general fact-finding, monitoring, and reporting of human rights violations in which the HRD has long been engaged (as well, for that matter,
as NGOs like Human Rights Watch).203 Instead, drawing from the experience of personnel in other post-conflict zones, it engages in “professional data gathering and analysis”204 with the aim of producing evidence that can be used in criminal trials.205 Upon deciding to investigate
an incident, the Special Investigations Unit puts together multidisciplinary teams of six to ten people from various MONUC units.206 This
team travels to the affected area, conducts a physical investigation, and
interviews victims and witnesses, as well as perpetrators when possible.207
For example, in the initial investigation that launched the Special
Investigations Unit, the HRD carried out an inquiry into an attack
called Effacer le Tableau (“erasing the board”) that took place in the Ituri
184 (transnational legal process); Reisman et al., supra note 17, at 578–80 (policy-oriented
jurisprudence); Slaughter, supra note 159, at 195–97 (transgovernmentalism).
200 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 18.
201 MONUC, Human Rights: Mandate and Activities, http://www.monuc.org/news.
aspx?newsID=761&menuOpened=Activities (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
202 MONUC, Human Rights: Special Investigations Unit, http://www.monuc.org/
news.aspx?newsID=769 (last visited Sept. 27, 2008); see also Roberto Ricci, Human Rights
Challenges in the DRC: A View from MONUC’s Human Rights Section, in Challenges of Peace
Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 97, 99
(Mark Malan & João Gomes Porto eds., 2004).
203 See Ricci, supra note 202, at 99.
204 Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, HR Component of the UN Peace
Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/5/
rdc.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
205 Ricci, supra note 202, at 99; Telephone Interview with Anonymous R (Feb. 14,
2008) [hereinafter R Interview] (contact information and notes on file with author).
206 R Interview, supra note 205.
207 Id.
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town of Mambasa and nearby areas. The Mouvement de Libération du
Congo (“MLC”) militia went from house to house systematically, raping
women and stealing property from each one, as well as engaging in acts
of cannibalism. The investigators spent about two-and-a-half months
total over the course of two visits investigating this attack and interviewing victims, witnesses, and perpetrators. At that time, there was no domestic justice system whatsoever in the region, so the HRD preserved
the evidence for future use and produced several widely publicized reports. These served as the catalyst for the Security Council’s authorization of additional peacekeepers and an expansion of the UN mandate
in Congo—as well as for prosecutions in the court system later on.208
The HRD’s Justice Support Unit picks up at the end of the Special Investigation Unit’s investigations. It lobbies for the arrest and
prosecution of suspects and provides “advice and technical assistance
to magistrates and other legal personnel involved in bringing these
cases to trial,” as well as “[f]acilitation and support to the prosecution
investigation.”209 Legal Officers have met with prosecutors and judges,
discussed relevant legal issues, and provided them with legal materials, including copies of international treaties. Part of this activity has
been advocacy for use of the Rome Statute.210
For example, in the Mambasa situation, the HRD opened a field
office nearby, and other MONUC officers followed up on the initial
investigation. When UN peacekeeping forces arrived and began to stabilize the region, the HRD started pushing for trials. The European
Union paid for a prosecutor to come to Ituri from Kinshasa, financing
his salary and bringing him in from outside the region in an effort to
ensure his impartiality and honesty. MONUC investigators facilitated
the work of prosecutors by sharing factual information, meeting jointly
with witnesses whom they had already interviewed in their investigation, and providing security for victims and witnesses. For a long while,
they worked with the prosecutors on a daily basis.211
As the Mambasa cases progressed, other needs developed and additional partnerships were created to meet them. For example, both
208 Id.; see also Discussion Notes, Part Two, in Challenges of Peace Implementation,
supra note 202, at 123, 130–31.
209 MONUC, Human Rights: Justice Support Unit, http://www.monuc.org/news.
aspx?newsID=767 (last visited Sept. 27, 2008); see also Dec. 2005 MONUC Report, supra
note 128, at 15; G Interview, supra note 87.
210 See June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 11; F Interview, supra note 94; G
Interview, supra note 87; Feb. 18 E-mail, supra note 183.
211 R Interview, supra note 205. Information-sharing is, however, limited on a case by
case basis for the protection of victims and witnesses. Id.
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the defendants and the victims needed lawyers, and so the NGO Avocats sans Frontières (“ASF”) found, coordinated, and paid local attorneys to represent both sides. Another UN agency began providing witness protection. As the cases moved toward trial, everything had to be
rebuilt from the ground up. The EU repaired the courtroom, while an
NGO repaired the prisons. The judges were paid by the EU but lived
inside the MONUC military camp for their protection. All this time,
MONUC and others were pressing for arrests and then for prosecutions.212
Notably absent in all of this is any participation by the International Criminal Court. Indeed, although MONUC investigators made
a point of getting victims’ and witnesses’ permission to share their
statements with the ICC and although they did eventually share some
of this information pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding
between MONUC and the ICC, this was a one way street. The ICC did
not provide any resources for the investigations or prosecutions nor
did it play any other role in the process whatsoever.213
Also notable is that much of this activity has been driven, not by
institutional directives or policy, but by individual initiative.214 For example, MONUC’s investigations and interactions with the local judiciary are within the scope of MONUC’s mandate and were ultimately endorsed by the Secretary General.215 These initiatives, however, were
instigated, not top-down by the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights or the Security Council, but on the ground by officers in
the HRD.216 Crucial developments such as the creation of the Special
Investigations Unit were catalyzed by the experience of individual MONUC officers in other UN administrations in other post-conflict settings, where similar investigative techniques had been used.217 MONUC
continued to be actively involved while I was in Kinshasa. Special investigations were ongoing, and human rights officers continued to provide
legal support to the trials and to follow the outcomes.218

212 Id.
213 Id. In its peacekeeping capacity, MONUC has also agreed to offer support for arrests pursuant to ICC arrest warrants. 2007 ICC Report, supra note 74, at 8.
214 See R Interview, supra note 205.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 F Interview, supra note 94; G Interview, supra note 87; R Interview, supra note 205;
E-mail exchange with Anonymous A (Oct. 24–29, 2007) (e-mails on file with author); see
also Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 204.
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Despite the impressive scope of these efforts, however, it is also
important to note that they have been consistently dwarfed by the
events in question. For example, MONUC’s investigations were initially
limited solely to the region of Ituri, although this is only one of the active conflict zones, and even later its involvement in other areas of the
country was relatively limited. It had no hope of, for example, deploying teams to investigate reports of mass graves because it lacked the
necessary personnel and resources.219 Nor has MONUC often seen the
results it would like even in those areas where it has had resources to
deploy. For example, the result of all the effort described in the Mombasa cases above was, in the end, disappointing: although prosecutors
had originally expressed willingness to prosecute all identified suspects,
in the end only a few people were arrested, and even they escaped from
prison.220 Courts in Ituri, where MONUC and others have invested substantial resources, have continued to prosecute atrocities under the
Rome Statute. But even there MONUC has been disappointed to see
some key convictions for international crimes overturned on appeal.221
As other investigations and prosecutions have proceeded, the network of NGOs, international organizations, and government and local
actors has continued to evolve and expand. The most direct role in the
trials has continued to be played by ASF, which has worked with defense attorneys for the defendants in some of these prosecutions.222
ASF has also continued to work with MONUC on prioritizing trials and
providing other assistance for victims and defendants.223 The international NGO Global Rights has been organizing a trial monitoring program for these trials as well as others in military and civilian courts.224
In addition to the activities described above, MONUC’s Human Rights
Division has provided financial and personnel support for domestic
investigations on at least one occasion.225
The efforts of these networks, however, are not limited to these
particular trials. Instead, the networks promote post-conflict justice
through broader efforts at redeveloping the legal system, by pushing
legislative reform, conducting studies of the current system, and developing capacity-building and gap-filling programs. On the legislative
219 Discussion Notes, Part Two, supra note 208, at 123, 125, 129.
220 R interview, supra note 205.
221 E.g., Kahwa case, supra note 184, at 4.
222 J Interview, supra note 128.
223 F Interview, supra note 94.
224 LaRoche Interview, supra note 91.
225 Dec. 2005 MONUC Report, supra note 128, at 15.
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front, for example, Global Rights and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (“USAID”) promoted legislation reforming the laws
against sexual violence to cover a broader range of sexual attacks,
which have been endemic in the conflict. This legislation was passed
while I was in Kinshasa in June 2006.226 Global Rights, with support
from USAID, also produced a pioneering study in August 2005 on the
problem of violence and impunity in eastern Congo; this study has
been widely used as the basis for reform efforts as it is the only comprehensive empirical information available on the courts in that region.227 The Restoration of the Justice System of Eastern Congo (“REJUSCO”) is a major program to address the gaps identified by Global
Rights in that study, and USAID and the aid branches of other foreign
embassies have been the central partners in this initiative.228 The NGO
RCN Justice & Démocratie (“RCN”) has developed outreach and training programs on post-conflict legal matters, such as the problem of internally displaced persons returning to their land to find that it has
been redistributed (legally) by local leaders in their absence.229 RCN’s
programs are also funded primarily by embassies.230 Similarly, the U.K.
Department for International Development (“DFID”), the British
equivalent to USAID, funded an ASF program to develop “mobile
courts” to travel to rural areas and hear cases. These courts fill some of
the gaps created by the dearth of courts in most of the country.231
226 See Code Pénal, supra note 110, arts. 167–74; Global Rights, Une loi sur la répression des violences sexuelles: De quoi s’agit-il? 2 (2006) [hereinafter Une loi], available
at http://www.globalrights.org/site/DocServer/DRC_SexViolencePamphFIN_Eversion.pdf;
Interview with Deko Moleka-Bekangba, Program Officer, USAID, in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep.
Congo ( June 20, 2006) (notes on file with author); see also LaRoche Interview, supra note 91
(describing other legal reform projects). See generally Global Rights, Une nouvelle législation sur l’indépendance du pouvoir judiciare: Chemin obligé pour l’instauration
de l’Etat de droit en RDC (2006), available at http://gr.convio.net/site/DocServer/DRC_
Advocacy_Judicial_Guide.pdf (discussing proposed legislation on judicial independence).
227 See generally Quelle justice pour les populations vulnérables à l’Est de la RDC?, SOS Justice
(Global Rights, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 2005, available at http://www.globalrights.org/
site/PageServer?pagename=www_afr_sosjustice. Global Rights has also instigated a study of
traditional justice systems as a first step toward developing programs aimed at these systems. LaRoche Interview, supra note 91.
228 Interview with Pierre Kanika, Ministry of Justice, in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo,
( June 27, 2006) (notes on file with author).
229 Interview with Aurore Decarnieres & Delphin Bulambo, RCN Justice & Démocratie, in Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo ( June 28, 2006) [hereinafter Decarnieres & Bulambo
Interview] (notes on file with author) (describing other projects).
230 Id.
231 Interview with Oliver Blake, Governance Advisor, Dept. for Int’l Dev., in Kinshasa,
Dem. Rep. Congo ( June 23, 2006) (notes on file with author) (describing other projects).
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Likewise, the HRD’s efforts also extend beyond the atrocity trials
to other legal reform projects. In response to the interrelated problems of arbitrary arrests and long periods of preventative detention,
for example, officers visited more than thirty prisons, produced a report, offered some technical assistance, and urged the lead prosecutor to circulate a memo to all prosecutors instructing them to follow
new procedures that would comply with human rights norms. The
HRD has also been involved in developing recommendations for reform legislation and in other work on transitional justice issues.232
Thus, a vast network of national and international actors is pushing a transitional justice agenda for reform and reconstruction of the
judicial system. Atrocity trials are one part of this agenda. MONUC,
NGOs, local attorneys and government officials, and the aid branches
of foreign embassies have played a variety of roles in these trials and in
promoting post-conflict justice more generally. Frequently, they engage
in joint action: embassies finance projects that are then carried out by
international and national NGOs, which often manage the projects
through local partners.
5. Conclusions Concerning Mechanisms
Three relevant conclusions can be drawn from these patterns of
activity. On the ground, there is not a sharp division between postconflict justice and legal reform. Rather, the deployment of the Rome
Statute within these cases is embedded in a wide range of justice-related
activities. Furthermore, these reform programs are not the work of individual actors in isolation. Instead, embassies, international organizations, and NGOs are forming shifting and overlapping partnerships to
address different aspects of post-conflict justice. Finally, the exception
to these practices of partnership and broad legal reform is the ICC. It
has pursued its own investigations and publicized its own activities
rather than joining with other organizations to support domestic efforts at reform and justice.
It is striking that the most obvious and traditional mechanisms by
which legal rules are transmitted have proved to be the most feeble in
moving the Rome Statute from the international realm to its place in
the Massaba, Ngoy, and other atrocity cases. Certainly the DRC legislature instigated the process by bringing the country into the Rome Statute treaty regime, and the ICC set positive background conditions for
232 F Interview, supra note 94.
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domestic incorporation with its investigations and prosecutions. Nonetheless, the Statute and its norms would have languished as mere formal rules but for the decisions of domestic judges, facilitated by a network of embassy donors, NGOs, local attorneys, and MONUC.
D. Crucial Features: Functional Hybrids and Domestic Control
In the previous Section, I relied on the commonalities between the
theories of transnational legal process, transgovernmentalism, legal
pluralism, and policy-oriented jurisprudence to ground a relatively
thick description of the processes by which networks of international
and national actors have promoted post-conflict justice in the Congo.
In this Section, I turn to the differences between these theories in an
effort to understand the features of these transnational networks that
have been crucial to the international-law-incorporating results.
I consider first the contribution that theories of transnational networks, transnational judicial dialogue, and transnational legal process
make to our descriptive understanding of the post-conflict justice networks in the DRC. These theories are descriptively useful at varying levels, but they do not help us to identify the crucial characteristics of
these networks that make them effective as law-conveying tools. For this
purpose, I turn to theories of legal pluralism and policy-oriented jurisprudence, which offer the concepts of hybridity and authority.
Ultimately, I conclude that certain distinctive characteristics of
these networks have contributed to the development of what I call
“functional hybrids”: hybrid international-national processes that build
from the strengths of their international and national components.
Furthermore, the fact that control over atrocity trials remains in domestic hands, while controversial for the reasons discussed in Part I on international courts, nonetheless promotes domestic institution-building
and the long-term goals of post-conflict justice.
1. Transnational Networks, Dialogues, and Processes
a. Transnational Network Theory
Much of the seminal work on transnational networks has concerned transgovernmental networks of national government officials
and their foreign counterparts, often in the context of economic regula-
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tion.233 Recently, scholars have begun to suggest that the sorts of transgovernmental networks that have strengthened domestic capabilities
and promoted transnational norm convergence in regulatory and economic contexts might also be useful in the spheres of justice and human
rights.234
At the same time, scholars concerned with international criminal
law and international human rights law have identified looser transnational networks operating in these arenas. These networks are not
strictly transgovernmental in nature, nor do they consist of domestic
officials and their horizontally matched foreign counterparts. Instead,
they have wide-ranging members, from state actors to NGOs, international organizations, and domestic attorneys and associations. Rather
than being characterized by the development of formal associations
and cooperation, these networks interact in a looser, ad hoc fashion.
The coalitions promoting the importation of international criminal
law norms and the pursuit of domestic trials for violation of those
norms in the DRC seem to be another example of such a network.
For example, Margaret McGuinness’s description of the role of
transnational advocacy networks and what she calls “norm portals” in
importing international human rights norms into the U.S. legal system
presents some relevant parallels.235 She describes an ad hoc network of
foreign governments, domestic attorneys, and international organizations coalescing around a common substantive issue (abolition of the
death penalty); as she explains it, this network was catalyzed by, and
pursued its broader policy goals through, individual death penalty cases
in the United States.236 Like the networks at work in the Congo, this
network comprises a diverse group of actors brought together by their
interest in a particular substantive issue rather than by membership in
common associations or by relationships as horizontal counterparts.
Further, McGuinness describes a process of transnational norm
transfer that is characterized by a combination of formal and informal
233 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 11–12 (2002); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1041, 1045 (2003); Slaughter, supra note 159, 195–97.
234 Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 327, 336 (2006); cf. Hari M. Osofsky
& Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks? Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L.
409, 414 (2008) (transnational environmental networks).
235 See Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of
International Human Rights, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 755, 760 (2006).
236 Id. at 808–24.
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mechanisms, and in which the primary point of entry into the domestic legal system is a formal, domestic legal mechanism.237 Similarly, in
the Congo, the formal mechanism of ratifying the ICC treaty, together
with the state’s cooperation with the ICC in the Lubanga investigation, the voluntary work of MONUC investigatory and legal teams, the
work of domestic attorneys on individual atrocity cases, and the indirect efforts of NGOs and foreign embassies on justice and impunity
generally, all coalesced to enable the adoption of international standards in certain atrocity cases.238 Here, as in the U.S. cases that
McGuinness considers, the immediate mechanism by which this was
possible was a treaty that could be invoked in the context of domestic
litigation and that provided a legal basis for courts to adopt the international norms in question over competing domestic norms.239
In addition to her work on the ICC, Jenia Turner has also described nascent international criminal law networks.240 She focuses
primarily on transgovernmental networks of investigatory, prosecutorial, and judicial national government counterparts. But while looser
transnational networks are not her primary focus, she also describes
and advocates the development of networks with vital roles for nongovernmental entities and actors, such as NGOs and the ICC.241 Turner is
particularly concerned with the potential for joint action networks:
networks that “engage [transnational] participants daily in face-to-face
joint activities—investigation, adjudication, prosecution—for a sustained period of time.”242 She conceives of hybrid courts as the institutionalization of such a network.243
Although the networks that Turner describes and advocates are
considerably more formal and structured than those at work in the
Congo, they share certain important characteristics. In particular,
Turner points to the substantial roles played by NGOs and the ICC in
facilitating existing transgovernmental international criminal law networks. She also emphasizes the importance of engaging these nongovernmental actors in states where domestic institutions are weak.244
These characteristics are of course particularly salient in places like the
237 Id. at 832–33.
238 See supra notes 164–232 and accompanying text.
239 See McGuinness, supra note 235, at 837–39; see also supra notes 164–232 and accompanying text.
240 Turner, supra note 34, at 986.
241 Id. at 1000–17.
242 Id. at 1017.
243 Id. at 1018.
244 Id. at 1000–06.
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Congo, where rebuilding domestic institutions is a primary goal of the
operating networks.
The networks supporting the Congolese military trials are looser
than the joint action networks that Turner identifies. They also seem to
have been functioning to some degree consecutively rather than concurrently and with overlapping rather than co-extensive responsibilities.245
Nonetheless, these networks involve members of different organizations
in the same general task, relying on close interactions between individuals rather than on impersonal bureaucratic mechanisms for their functioning. Accordingly, they present some opportunities for mutual education and support.
There is another important characteristic of the networks in the
Congo that is not mentioned by either Turner or McGuiness in their
descriptions of transnational networks: the rapid transfer of personnel
and thus of information and skills from one post-conflict setting to another.246 Here, the phenomenon that I call “tribunal-hopping”247 comes
into play: UN officers and other UN employees on short-term contracts
are moving rapidly from tribunal to tribunal (e.g., from the ICTY, to the
ICTR, to the Special Court for Sierra Leone) and from UN administration to UN administration (e.g., from Kosovo to the DRC). With each
“hop,” they bring along their experiences of the norms and processes at
work in each tribunal and administration and thereby spread this
knowledge from one distant location to another.248 A similar phenome245 For example, MONUC seems to take the lead in the investigative phase, with some
interaction with government investigators, but in the trial phase its role diminishes to a
supportive one. At that stage, ASF seems to be the leading nongovernmental actor as it
provides assistance to defense attorneys. F Interview, supra note 94; G Interview, supra note
87; J Interview, supra note 128.
246 See generally McGuinness, supra note 235; Turner, supra note 34.
247 I describe and analyze this phenomenon in greater detail in a forthcoming symposium article. See Elena Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 10 Or.
Rev. Int’l L. 361 (2008).
248 See id. I observed this phenomenon while in Kosovo in 2004 and 2005, in Sierra
Leone in 2005, and in the DRC in 2006. My observations about the rapid turnover at these
missions and the short duration of appointments are confirmed by the UN’s recruitment
policies and practices and by a UN audit indicating high staff turnover in special peacekeeping missions and financial and career advancement incentives for quick movement between
special peacekeeping posts. See The Secretary-General, Follow-up Audit of the Policies and Procedures of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for Recruiting International Civilian Staff for Field
Missions, ¶ 11, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/152 ( July 15, 2004); The Secretary-General, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the Audit of the Policies and Procedures of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for Recruiting International Civilian Staff for Field
Missions, ¶ 2, at 45–46, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/56/202 ( July 20, 2002).
Official sources indicate initial contracts of six months; one unofficial estimate was of movement roughly every one and a half to three years, depending on the opportunities available
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non occurs in other foreign service institutions, including USAID,
DFID, and their counterparts, as well as in NGOs.249 As a consequence,
the “lessons learned” of one post-conflict setting move quickly to the
next, and people within the networks maintain personal contacts from
one post to the next, facilitating the networks’ effective functioning.250
Of course, not all the consequences of this rapid movement of personnel are positive: it is difficult to acquire sufficient local knowledge to operate effectively during the short durations of these postings.
The transnational networks that Turner and McGuiness have studied are of course not identical to those at work in the Congo; in particular, they do not seem to share this crucial characteristic of rapid
movement of personnel. Nonetheless, their descriptions of transnational networks driven by individual interactions and harnessed to
achieve a particular goal capture certain core characteristics of the coalitions promoting post-conflict justice in the Congo.
b. Transnational Judicial Dialogue
Transnational judicial dialogue, as the name suggests, describes
national and international judges engaging in a dialogue concerning
legal norms that is more mutual and interactive than the paradigm of
national courts simply importing international law in the cases before
them.251 Thus, national judges are said to take part in a “much more
diverse and messy process of judicial interaction across, above and below borders, exchanging ideas and cooperating in cases involving national as much as international law” through direct and indirect interchanges.252
In this respect, the Congolese courts’ interface with international
law resembles the traditional model. As discussed above, the Congolese
courts are almost absolutely isolated from their international and for-

elsewhere. See, e.g., UN Peace Operations Recruitment Centre, Information Sheet, https://
jobs.un.org/Galaxy/Release3/VacancyFM/RecruitmentInfo.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008);
see also R Interview, supra note 205.
249 U.S. foreign service officers, for example, are assigned to one- to two-year posts in
conflict and post-conflict settings, with a maximum three-year stay. E-mail from Tracy Naber, Foreign Svc. Officer, U.S. State Dept. to Elena Baylis [author] (Mar. 6, 2008) (on file
with author).
250 Baylis, supra note 247.
251 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 1103, 1104 (2000);
Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in
Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 Geo. L.J. 487, 490 (2005).
252 Slaughter, supra note 251, at 1104.
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eign colleagues by the dearth of conduits of information.253 With rare
exceptions,254 the Congolese courts do not cite foreign or international
judgments, much less have more robust contacts with their counterparts abroad.255 Similarly, international and foreign judges have no way
to access the Congolese judgments I discuss here: the opinions are unpublished and undistributed, and I myself obtained them only through
personal contacts with people in Kinshasa.
Transnational judicial dialogue, therefore, does not offer a useful
model for understanding the interactions in the Congo, at least not yet.
It is best suited to understanding judicial interactions in highly developed countries, where judges have ready access to their counterparts
abroad. Accordingly, it has typically been applied to such contexts.256
This raises an important forward-looking question: whether crafting a connection to existing transnational judicial dialogues should be
a goal of legal reform and post-conflict justice efforts. If dialogue between national judicial actors in different countries does in fact shape
international law, then the Congolese courts and judges are the worse
for not having contact with it. As a consequence, they cannot benefit
from the norms produced by that dialogue, and their experience and
views do not play a role in crafting the concerned international legal
rules. Melissa Waters, a proponent of transnational judicial dialogue,
argues that “a relative handful of courts in a handful of (mostly rich
Western) countries have an outsized influence over the dialogue taking place—and over the content of the norms emerging from that
dialogue.”257 In effect, these “repeat players . . . actively export their
own countries’ norms to weaker courts, who then internalize these
foreign norms into their own domestic legal systems.”258
This is a particularly troubling dynamic in the context of postconflict justice and atrocity trials, as the states that are cut off from this
dialogue, like the Congo, are by and large the states in which atrocities
occur and thus are the states with the most immediate interest in the
253 See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
254 It is notable that, among the judgments that I have reviewed, all of these exceptions
have been from the Ituri courts, where MONUC and other participants in the transnational networks described here have directly promoted the use of international law in
atrocity trials. See, e.g., Mulombo case, supra note 158, at 40–41; Kahwa case, supra note 184,
at 26–27. However, I have been able to acquire only a handful of recent judgments, which
may not be representative of the remainder.
255 See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
256 Waters, supra note 39, at 464.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 464–65.
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development of the relevant international criminal law norms. Although there are few atrocity trials in the “rich Western” countries to
which Waters refers, there are some, whether concerning internal matters or under universal jurisdiction.259 Furthermore, the international
and hybrid tribunals have a large number of jurists from such states and
far fewer, if any, from post-conflict states.260 Even granting that the incapacity of national tribunals in post-conflict states complicates these
questions, surely it does not make sense for an area of law that is directed at a particular set of states with a particular set of extreme and
unique experiences of violence to be shaped almost exclusively by a
totally different set of states that for the most part lack any recent experience of the violence with which the law is concerned. Similarly, for
internationalists in the ICC and elsewhere, a lack of judicial dialogue
with post-conflict states is both a missed opportunity to influence national courts and also to benefit from their views as part of what AnneMarie Slaughter calls “collective judicial deliberation” on the critical
problems of developing legal responses to mass atrocities.261
c. Transnational Legal Process
Transnational legal process theory also provides a description of
transnational interactions that could be applied to the mechanisms at
work in the Congo; however, its analysis is not completely apt. As conceived by Harold Koh, “Transnational legal process theory describes
the theory and practice of how public and private actors . . . interact
in a variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to
make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of transnational law.”262
In identifying factors that affect a state’s incorporation of international law, transnational legal process draws our attention to processes, actors, and venues similar to those discussed by transnational
network theorists.263 Koh describes transnational issue networks of
259 See id. at 464.
260 See, e.g., Press Release, Coalition for the International Criminal Court, First Eighteen
Judges Elected to the International Criminal Court (Feb. 7, 2003), available at http://www.
iccnow.org/documents/0207200318_judges_final.pdf; ICTY Key Figures (Oct. 17, 2003),
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm.
261 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev.
99, 119 (1994).
262 Koh, supra note 16, at 183–84.
263 See Harold Hongju Koh, Professor of Law, Yale University, Address at the 1998
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home (Apr. 8, 1998), in 35 Hous. L. Rev.
623, 647–52 (1998); supra notes 233–250 and accompanying text.
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transnational norm entrepreneurs and governmental norm sponsors
who seek law-declaring fora where norms can be introduced264—a
succinct description of the process by which the Rome Statute was introduced into military courts in the Congo. Koh’s more detailed descriptions of these actors and activities also resonate. His networks are
composed of international and domestic actors, state and nonstate
actors. Legal norms move dynamically from international to domestic
settings, public to private fora, and back again.265
In another sense, however, transnational legal process is a less satisfactory description. Koh’s theory focuses primarily on the incentives for
incorporating international law at the state level, pointing to the “frictions and contradictions” that arise when states fail to comply with international law yet want to gain the benefits of participating in international systems.266 Certainly such benefits were a strong incentive for the
DRC’s initial decisions to participate in the Rome Statute treaty system
and to refer its situation to the ICC.267 Perhaps at some point in the future the DRC will experience some international friction for its failure,
for example, to pass implementing legislation for the Statute or to hold
more extensive trials, and maybe then this friction will be passed down
through the system from the affected politicians to the court system and
eventually to individual trial judges. But this concept does not seem to
capture the current dynamic, which is bottom-up,268 small scale, and
driven by individual interchanges rather than state or even institutional
ones. That is, it is particular UN officers in a particular division of MONUC (among others) interacting with individual courts and judicial officers who have brought about this effect, not a relatively distant and
intangible state-level incentive. The use of international law and pursuit
of atrocity trials is not spreading mechanistically, bureaucratically, or
institutionally, but personally and individually, through one-to-one contacts.269
Koh’s normative claims for transnational legal process also do not
provide a good normative explanation of the processes at work in the
Congo. That is primarily because the theory is intended to answer a
very particular question, “why nations obey” international law, which is
264 Koh, supra note 263, at 647–52.
265 Koh, supra note 16, at 184.
266 Id. at 203.
267 See id.
268 See Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 125, 128–29 (2005).
269 For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Baylis, supra note 247.
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not the most useful line of inquiry here.270 Transnational legal process
responds to a longstanding debate in the literature about whether obligations imposed by international law are truly legal and whether the
law itself exerts any compliance pull in the international arena.271 In
answering these questions, Koh conceives of the purpose and function
of transnational legal process as a process of “internalization of” or
“compliance with” international law.272
I am less sanguine about the notion that compliance with international law is or should be the goal of the transnational legal interactions
in the Congo. In my view, the fundamental problem of impunity in the
Congo is not a lack of international law in particular but a lack of any
law whatsoever. Individuals operate with no fear whatsoever of legal
consequences for their actions, and MONUC’s human rights reports
describe a pattern of vigilantism born of this total failure of legal order.273 There are any number of approaches—international, national,
and local, legal and quasi-legal—that would represent improvements
on the present situation. Importation of international law is only one. I
am in favor of anything that can hope to offer some redress for the suffering in the Congo, and if importing international law helps to promote this end, then I am in favor of international law. But I would
equally be in favor of other measures that might reach the same
ends.274 What international law has going for it in this instance is in
some part the existence of those norm entrepreneurs and issue networks (to use the terminology that Koh has adopted) who are willing to
put resources into its enforcement. If local or other legal systems had
the same resources, they might be just as effective, but because they do
not, international law has more hope of being successful in filling the
great legal gaps that characterize the justice system in the Congo. This
does not mean that compliance with international law is an end in itself, but rather, that international law might be a means to make progress toward the reinstitution of post-conflict legal order.275
Furthermore, Koh’s analysis seems to presume the inevitable final
triumph of international law. The cases he describes are narratives of
270 Koh, supra note 16, at 183.
271 See id. at 192–93.
272 Id. at 199.
273 See MONUC April 2007 Assessment, supra note 195, ¶ 67.
274 See infra notes 278–297 and accompanying text; see also Drumbl, supra note 19, at
194–205.
275 I do not mean, here or elsewhere, to suggest that the use of international law might
in itself re-establish legal order. The process of instituting legal order after a conflict is
extraordinarily complex. See generally Stromseth et al., supra note 20.
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marches toward international compliance marked by setbacks and
about-faces but nonetheless eventually arriving at their goal.276 In contrast, it cannot be overemphasized how unusual these trials are in the
Congo. Far from being indicative of a growing trend toward prosecution of those responsible for these misdeeds, the trend seems to be, if
anything, moving in the other direction since these trials took place.277
I am, therefore, skeptical about placing this situation in the context of
Koh’s progressive narrative of increasing compliance with international
law as an eventual, inevitable good. Indeed, to the contrary, these trials
are interesting and important precisely because they are so exceptional—because amidst the legal and social chaos in the Congo, these
trials happened, and they happened better because of international law
than they would have without it.
d. Conclusions
Transnational network theory and, to a lesser extent, transnational
legal process offer useful categories for conceptualizing the constituent
elements, interrelationships, and processes that make up transnational
legal interactions like those in the Congo. In turn, the interchanges
between international and domestic actors in the DRC confirm these
theories’ on-the-ground accuracy and usefulness to some extent. These
theories, however, do not offer a means of identifying the crucial features of these interchanges that have produced an international-lawincorporating result, nor do they provide answers for the normative
questions of the purpose and consequences of incorporating international law in this post-conflict setting.
2. Hybridity and Authority
Two other theories, legal pluralism and policy-oriented jurisprudence offer some insight into the questions of significance and of ultimate goals. Having rejected the notion that the trajectory in this situation is toward compliance or obedience to international law, which
paradigm (if any) does describe the dynamic at work, and what should
be the aim of these interactions?

276 See Koh, supra note 16, at 194–99.
277 Clifford, supra note 103.
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a. Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralism theory draws our attention to the multiplicity of
legal regimes, norms, and actors that are in play in any given situation
and describes the complex and dynamic interchanges between these
overlapping and contesting legal systems.278 As described above, the
overlapping international and national definitions of atrocity crimes in
effect in the Congo have created a situation of legal pluralism. Of
course, should all the Congolese military courts adopt the Rome Statute, this situation would abate, as the Congolese national law would in
effect have been superseded by international law. But if we look beyond
the rules themselves to the systems of legal enforcement that are in
place, there is far more pluralism at work than just this.
For example, there are at least three systems of investigating atrocities for purposes of criminal prosecution: the ICC’s, MONUC’s and the
Congo’s. The ICC prosecutor and Congolese prosecutors make formally
authoritative (though not always implemented) decisions about whom to
prosecute, while the HRD makes unauthoritative but powerful recommendations.279 In addition, NGOs have conducted their own investigations. While not intended to produce evidence for criminal trials, these
investigations add compelling accounts to the depictions of the atrocities
and the corresponding calls for justice.280 Because it is so difficult logistically to acquire information about what is happening in eastern Congo,
and because there are no widely trusted sources of public information in
the Congolese media or government, these investigations and accounts
are relied upon to construct credible descriptions of the problem and to
legitimize proposed legal and extralegal responses.281
For while in one sense these trials are isolated legal processes in a
field of impunity, in another sense they are one of many nascent legal
reform initiatives aimed at redressing atrocities and other conflictrelated harms through legal processes. Some of these initiatives compete with the present atrocity trials: for example, some NGOs have
called for jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity to
278 Drumbl, supra note 19, at 186 (advocating “cosmopolitan pluralism”); Berman, supra note 18, at 1164–68.
279 While not backed by formal power of authority, the MONUC peacekeeping forces
and other conduits of influence available to the UN back these recommendations with the
power of threatened intervention, of one sort or another. See United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Background Note: 31 July 2008, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/
bnote010101.pdf.
280 E.g., SOS Justice, supra note 87, at 6–8.
281 See supra notes 227–228 and accompanying text.
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be transferred from military to civilian courts, apparently out of skepticism about the capabilities of military courts.282 UN peacekeepers
(some of whom were accused in 2005 of sexual attacks upon the population they were supposed to protect) are subject to neither the military
nor the civilian regimes within the Congo. They can be prosecuted
solely in their home countries, if they are prosecuted at all.283 Other
initiatives supplement the military trials: as discussed above, Global
Rights and USAID promoted a law against sexual violence that imposes
criminal liability for a broader range of sexual offenses than were previously recognized under Congolese criminal law. This law, passed in
June 2006, extends the reach of the civilian courts to overlap with the
military courts’ jurisdiction over some sex crimes.284 The NGO RCN’s
work with local chefs coutumiers in eastern Congo to develop local legal
processes for resolving land disputes arising from the return of internally displaced persons, also mentioned above, is another example of a
supplementary initiative.285
I could go on recounting pluralities for pages, but this should suffice to prove the point. But does recognizing these pluralities offer us
any additional understanding of the dynamics of the interactions in the
Congo? Importantly, in addition to its acknowledgment of (and indeed,
at times its relish of) the complexity of legal interactions, legal pluralism legitimizes hybridity as an end state rather than merely tolerating it
as a necessary if irritating transition point to another goal.286 So
whereas Koh’s transnational legal process presumes the ultimate aim to
be compliance with international law and sees the continued existence
of discrepancies between national law and practice and international
legal norms as a problem to be solved, legal pluralism takes a different
tack.287 It suggests that the overlap of legal regimes and the hurly-burly
this creates are inevitable in view of the overlapping claims of interest
and overlapping communities that underlie the contesting legal systems.288 Far better then, legal pluralism would suggest, to develop hybrid institutions and processes that provide opportunities for multiple

282 Clifford, supra note 103.
283 Susannah Price, DR Congo Sex Abuse Claims Upheld, BBC News, Jan. 8, 2005, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4156819.stm.
284 Une Loi, supra note 226, at 2.
285 Decarnieres & Bulambo Interview, supra note 229.
286 Berman, supra note 18, at 1236.
287 See Koh, supra note 16, at 194–99.
288 See Berman, supra note 18, at 1235–37.
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voices to be heard in multiple contexts, in order to genuinely accommodate those multiple interests and communities.289
In some sense, of course, this is exactly what the Congolese courts
have done. They are domestic courts directly applying international
law, and thus have transformed the criminal trials they oversee into a
hybrid domestic-international legal process.290 Similarly, by deploying
international investigators and legal officers into the domestic arena to
investigate crimes and then injecting their reports and legal and factual
findings into the domestic legal context, MONUC also is engaging in a
hybrid domestic-international process. Hearkening back, therefore, to
the discussion of hybrid courts above, other kinds of hybrid institutions
and processes are developing in the DRC, driven not top-down by legal
theorists and academics, but bottom-up by UN Human Rights Officers
and Congolese judges on the ground in order to solve the real world
legal problems they face.
Legal pluralism has been accused of being a purely descriptive
theory lacking normative content, on the one hand,291 and on the
other, of having a foolishly consistent normative commitment to plurality regardless of the comparative value of the positions at stake. Thus,
although legal pluralism does seem to offer a description of the situation on the ground, it must be asked whether it offers a normative perspective as well. As Paul Berman notes, “Describing mechanisms for
managing hybridity does not tell us how best to actually manage hybridity in particular cases.”292 Perhaps these Congolese hybrid processes are
merely a MacGyveristic293 response to the exigencies of the situation:
courts coping with the gaps in a national code and an international
administration coping with the limited resources of a country in conflict. If so, perhaps by accepting and even celebrating this hybridity, legal pluralism stops us short, and encourages us to accept a rubber band
289 Id. at 1237; see also Drumbl, supra note 19, at 182–87.
290 I am presuming here that the Congolese courts’ implementation of the Rome Statute will differ in some regards from the ICC’s implementation of the Statute, and that
those differences will, at least in part, reflect domestic preferences and norms.
291 Reisman et al., supra note 17, at 581–82.
292 Berman, supra note 18, at 1196–97 (emphasis omitted).
293 “MacGyver” was a TV show that aired from 1985 to 1992. See MacGyver: Summary,
http://www.tv.com/macgyver/show/706/summary.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008). The
main character was a secret agent who was known for getting himself out of hopelessly
sticky situations by quickly putting together a gadget out of whatever ordinary materials
were immediately available. Id. Such inventions have become known as “MacGyverisms.”
See Urban Dictionary: MacGyverism, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=
MacGyverism (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).

2009]

Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks

73

and duct tape solution rather than working for something more principled and enduring.
Whatever else may be said of these mechanisms, the fact that they
have arisen because they meet the exigencies of the situation tells us, at
a minimum, that they can function in the post-conflict context. Contrast
these hybrid mechanisms with the hybrid courts discussed earlier. Hybrid courts rely for their success on foreign judges who typically arrive
without expertise in the crucial areas of international criminal law and
judicial management of trials and are therefore ill-positioned to carry
this burden. In contrast, these hybrid processes rely on networks of UN
and foreign service officers whose careers are focused on international
law and human rights, who have been repeatedly immersed in conflict
and post-conflict settings, and who have access to the technical support,
information, and resources that the UN has at its disposal. At least from
the international side, the skills and experience of the actors in this hybrid system are far better aligned with the needs in the situation.
Another normative good that this plurality may provide is the
space for a multiplicity of legal and extra-legal mechanisms to address
atrocities. Although I believe that criminal trials in national tribunals
offer the international community an opportunity to fulfill its commitment to post-conflict justice in the long term, I am at the same time
deeply skeptical that these trials will consistently achieve justice, in a
procedural or substantive sense, on a case by case basis in the short
term. As described above, there are too many obstacles to their immediate success.294 This is precisely why international support would be
useful to them and why long-term reform of the national judicial system should be one of the fundamental goals of post-conflict justice. But
it also means that we cannot look to national trials to necessarily fulfill
some of the other goals of post-conflict justice, like reconciliation, accountability, and so on.295 By not attempting to resolve the messy plurality and hybridity of systems functioning in the DRC now, we will allow
294 See supra notes 79–94 and accompanying text.
295 There are also other reasons not to look to them to fulfill these goals, including
prominently, the limits upon the capacity of criminal trials to do so. I do think, however,
that these trials can successfully serve an expressive function of conveying the state’s intent
to restore order. For these and other reasons, in my view, it would be useful to more narrowly construe the goals of such trials to focus upon accurate determination of guilt for
individual perpetrators and victims (notwithstanding the fact that I anticipate frequent
failure in this regard) and upon contributing to the reintroduction of order and to social
confidence in that order. It is also worth noting that, in my experience, post-conflict societies do not seem to look to the judicial system to accomplish such grandiose goals as does
the international community.
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for at least the possibility of success through other means—a possibility
that would be foreclosed if international legal standards deployed in
the criminal justice system were to acquire a monopoly on redressing
atrocities.296 Thus, recognizing the imperfections of the criminal legal
process, we should also have an eye to whether these hybrids tend to
catalyze (or at least to leave space for) other forms of redress or, instead, to “squeeze out local approaches to justice, most notably those
that eschew the methods and modalities dominant internationally.”297
In the end, then, legal pluralism suggests that rather than looking to increased compliance with international law as the aim of
transnational interactions, we should accept hybridity, in which neither international nor national norms prevail entirely, as a possible
good end point. As such, it clears the way for us to look for what I will
call “functional hybrids”: hybrid mechanisms that function effectively
to resolve problems on the ground by building from the comparative
strengths of the national and international frameworks.
b. Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence
Like legal pluralism, policy-oriented jurisprudence takes pluralistic
communities as a given.298 But while policy-oriented jurisprudence also
identifies a multiplicity of social forces operating on law, it does not
sweep all legal and quasi-legal processes, institutions, and actors under
the aegis of law, as legal pluralism does.299 Instead, it defines law more
narrowly “as authoritative decision, combining elements of authority
and control.”300 “Authority” in this context refers to the legitimate exercise of power as defined by the expectations of the relevant community, and “control” to actual power to make and enforce decisions in
practice; both are determined empirically.301 Thus, while a complete
application of the policy-oriented jurisprudence methodology to this
study would be an article in itself, its emphasis on authoritative decision-making as the sine qua non of law directs us to one of the most dif296 See Drumbl, supra note 19, at 182–87; see also Berman, supra note 18, at 1197.
297 Drumbl, supra note 19, at 13.
298 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 159, at 26.
299 Berman, supra note 18, at 1177–78.
300 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 159, at 26; Reisman et al., supra note 17, at
579–80. However, policy-oriented jurisprudence does not focus solely on formal institutions; rather, a range of activities by a range of groups may be considered, so long as they
possess this crucial characteristic of authoritative decision. Lasswell & McDougal, supra
note 159, at 403.
301 See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 159, at 26; Reisman et al., supra note 17, at
579–80.
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ficult aspects of this situation: effective control over the legal decisionmaking process is contested both overtly and covertly, both between the
legal and political institutions of the national system and between the
international and national systems.
In particular, this distinction between authority and control draws
our attention to an important but as yet unexplored aspect of the interactions described above: the disparate allocation of authority and control amongst the actors. Again, contrast this hybrid structure with the
hybrid courts in place elsewhere, focusing for the moment on the processing of individual cases. On the one hand, the relationships between
foreign and national judges in hybrid courts are peer-to-peer, and all are
equally authoritative decisionmakers. Nonetheless, the foreign judges
typically have actual control over the courts’ decisions. In both Kosovo
and Sierre Leone, the hybrid panels of judges consist of a majority of
foreign judges and a minority of domestic judges, so that the foreign
judges can consistently determine the results in every case.302 In the
context of the Congolese national trials, in contrast, the foreign participants may control the processes of investigating, gathering evidence,
developing dossiers and reports, conducting legal research, and preparing legal briefs, but control of the legal decision itself belongs to the
domestic judges, who have the sole authority to try cases and issue
judgments. Any further efforts by MONUC officers or others to control
the outcome would violate the commitment to the rule of law that (at
least in part) motivates their participation in this process. Their legitimate role is thus limited to persuasion; they do not have control.
This lack of control, it should be added, appears to be a matter of
no small frustration to the involved MONUC officers, at least when the
prosecutions and/or convictions they seek are not forthcoming from
the courts. MONUC’s reports seethe at “unjustifiable delays” in “potentially landmark cases,”303 at the “important Ituri warlords” who “con-

302 Baskin, supra note 27, at 20–22 (describing Kosovo); Special Court of Sierra Leone,
supra note 51. However, this is not the case in the new hybrid court in Cambodia, where
Cambodian judges dominate the trial and appellate panels. Agreement Between the
United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution
Under Camodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea
art. 3(2), June 6, 2003, available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Agreement%
20between%20UN%20and%20RGC.pdf. But although Cambodian judges constitute the
majority on each panel, the rules for decisionmaking contain a supermajority requirement, such that at least one international judge must be in agreement with the decision.
Id. art. 4(1).
303 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 11.
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tinue to enjoy impunity for their crimes,”304 and at the overall “reluctance of the judicial authorities to progress in their investigations.”305
They list case after case in which evidence of a perpetrator’s wrongdoing has been provided to prosecutors and yet no action has been
taken.306 In one case, for example, “[m]ilitary prosecutors . . . are refusing to bring [the defendant] to trial on the basis of the available evidence,”307 and in another, “despite several substantiated complaints for
serious crimes filed before military judicial authorities, no judicial action was taken against [the defendant], or any of the men under his
command.”308
In this sense, MONUC’s reports echo a widely held belief that control over such cases is not in fact in the hands of the judges after all, but
rather, is exerted in many instances by political actors.309 MONUC itself
attributes the courts’ “reluctance” to move these cases forward “mainly
to undue external influence, but also to the lack of will, resources, and
capacity.”310 It is not clear from these reports whether political forces
always determine outcomes or solely prevent convictions. That is, one
possibility is that political interference is used only to prevent undesired trials from occurring, so that cases that go to trial and yield convictions are simply cases of political disinterest in which judges and
prosecutors did in fact exercise independent control. On the other
hand, it is also possible that political actors are actively at work in directing prosecutions and convictions irrespective of the guilt of the accused. As discussed in the Conclusion of this Article, in determining
where to draw the line in offering international support to national trials and institutions, this distinction could be important.
Thus, MONUC might reasonably protest that the distinction I
draw here between the allocation of authority and control in hybrid
courts versus the hybrid processes in the Congo is only superficially
correct. Arguably, while in a superficial sense authority and control are
better integrated in this hybrid process than in hybrid courts, in reality
there is merely a different disjuncture between the two, for turning authority over to domestic legal actors in fact means turning control over
to political actors. Accordingly, it is perhaps unsurprising that the idea
304 Id. at 12.
305 Id.
306 See id. at 11–12.
307 Id. at 11.
308 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 12.
309 E.g., SOS Justice, supra note 87, at 6–8.
310 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 12.
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of asserting international control by establishing hybrid panels of international and national judges to hear such cases is mentioned repeatedly in MONUC’s reports, though it has thus far come to nothing.311 Would such a move be successful? The reader is by now well
aware of my skepticism concerning the availability of appropriately experienced and skilled foreign jurists who would be willing to travel to
Kinshasa, much less to the more distant locations where these trials
have been held, deep in Congo’s conflict zones.
But more than this, I am concerned that there is a trade-off between international involvement and domestic development on several
levels. This trade-off is brought into focus by the control-authority distinction raised here. In a practical sense, financing hybrid panels tends
to direct resources toward foreign elements of the project rather than
toward domestic institutions. This diverts resources away from the longterm goal of developing domestic institutions. It is also costly. For example, the expense associated with importing and supporting foreign
judges and their staffs is exorbitant as compared to that of providing
consistent, reasonable salaries for national judges so that it is at least
conceivable for them to live on their salaries without taking bribes.312
Of course, in the Congolese context there is an additional complication: the use of military courts rather than civilian courts as venues
for atrocity trials inevitably means that investment in atrocity trials is to
some extent investment in the military justice system, rather than the
civilian one. This introduces a fresh divergence of resources from the
intended end of rebuilding a comprehensive system of national courts
to investment in the military courts, with their narrower mandate. This
is not entirely true, however, as evidenced by MONUC’s training of police and ASF’s work with defense attorneys, for example.
The most important thing to note about this particular dilemma is
that it will not necessarily exist elsewhere. It just so happens that in the
Congo the military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes, but in
311 Dec. 2005 MONUC Report, supra note 128, at 15; Discussion Notes, Part Two, supra
note 208, at 128.
312 See Tom Perrielo & Marieke Wierda, Int’l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, The
Special Court of Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny 30 (2006), available at http://www.
ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf; Sierra Leone: Special Court Needs $30 Million to
See War Crimes Trials Through, IRINNews.org, May 25, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/library/news/2005/05/mil-050525-irin03.htm; Robarts Interview, supra note
187; J Interview, supra note 128. However, international financing and support of domestic
reforms can also introduce problematic dynamics, as the sudden introduction of vast sums
of money can distort the incentives and interests of the domestic actors. See Ricci, supra
note 202, at 101.
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other states this is not necessarily the case. Accordingly, we should not
allow this peculiarity of the Congolese example to distract us from the
more general rule that investment in the domestic system is investment
in civilian courts. Where it does exist, of course, this presents an argument against extending substantial international resources into the
domestic system, at least so long as the international community’s goal
is to support the civilian justice system, rather than the military one.
Furthermore, in the exigencies of the Congolese context, developing the military justice system is arguably an appropriate expenditure of
international resources and energies. The conflict in Eastern Congo is
ongoing, and the atrocities being committed there seem to be, if anything, escalating in severity.313 Establishing order and adherence to the
rules of war that protect civilians is thus essential. The military justice
system is an appropriate way of controlling and sanctioning members
of the Congolese army operating in those regions.314
Even more fundamental than this concern about investment of
resources is another issue: international efforts to assert control over
war crimes trials undermine public perceptions of domestic authority
over the judicial system and thus undercut development and reform
efforts. At the most general level, the more control is exerted over
these processes by international actors in order to reach the right result315 in individual cases, the less control is held by domestic actors,
and hence the less responsibility, the less accountability, and the less
incentive to commit their “will, resources, and capacity”316 to a process
they do not control. Consider the possibilities. If domestic actors control the judicial process, international actors can promote domestic accountability for those processes by, as they are now doing, observing
and critiquing the domestic process and by calling for and supporting
efforts at reform. If international actors take control of the judicial aspects of this process, what then? As in Kosovo, domestic actors may step
back and ask to be relieved entirely of their duties (i.e., may seek to abrogate their authority).317 Certainly they will feel no sense of responsi313 See supra notes 79–112 and accompanying text.
314 It is also worth noting that this situation may not continue to exist in the Congo, as
the long-proposed implementing legislation for the ICC, if ever passed by the legislature,
would transfer jurisdiction over these crimes to the civilian courts.
315 By this, I mean the “right result” in both a procedural and substantive sense, that is,
that the guilty are convicted and the innocent exonerated through a fair and transparent
process. This is, of course, an entirely admirable goal.
316 June 2006 MONUC Report, supra note 91, at 12.
317 See Baskin, supra note 27, at 21. Baskin writes:
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bility for the results in these cases nor for the system as a whole, nor will
they be able to build public confidence in the authority of judicial institutions that are openly controlled by outsiders. It is an essential tenet of
good governance that accountability can be promoted only where lines
of responsibility are clear. Hybrid panels simultaneously blur responsibility and shift it to the involved international actors, allowing domestic
actors to shrug off claims for accountability.
This is not to suggest that Congolese courts (or indeed, most postconflict judicial systems) are already authoritative in the sense of having
public confidence and a public expectation that they will genuinely and
appropriately exercise control over legal disputes. To the contrary, as
suggested above, in Congo and in many post-conflict states, authority in
this sense does not exist, and control is frequently exerted, illicitly but
openly, by political and other influential actors. But this fact does not
necessarily mean that control should be shifted to the international
level. Rather, this is exactly why one of the purposes of post-conflict justice should be to reinstate (or even to instate) the authority of the judiciary. A necessary though insufficient precondition for doing so is for
the domestic judiciary to openly and obviously exercise control over
the cases before it.318
Thus, the question we need to consider is the ultimate goal of
these trials: are we focused upon the success of each immediate trial or
the development and reconstruction of the judicial system? If we look
to immediate outcomes, there is a tension between these two goals, for
it is true, as proponents of international trials have suggested, that national courts often do not have the capacity to handle atrocity trials
post-conflict. In many cases, however, including the Congolese situation, the fundamental problem that this statement identifies is not the
incapacity to handle atrocity trials as such but the complete breakdown
of the national court system. If we look instead to the question of investment of resources, the two goals are aligned: so long as the atrocity
trials are left within the domestic system, the international community’s
investment in promoting just outcomes in those trials will also promote

Kosovars propose that [the hybrid panels] be composed entirely of international judges instead of a minority of one Kosovar on a three-judge panel.
This would reflect the existing international control of the process of assigning sensitive cases and it would free Kosovar judges from being political hostages to rulings imposed by international jurists.
Id.

318 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 159, at 400 (“authority + control = law”).
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the redevelopment of the national system. In this sense, a conflict will
be created unnecessarily if the international community acts to disengage control over the immediate trials from local actors, thereby also
isolating the valuable financial and human resources that it pours into
atrocity trials from the domestic system.
Thus, it seems particularly significant that the international community’s support of atrocity trials in the Congo, including its promotion of use of the Rome Statute, is not isolated from efforts to rebuild
the judiciary. Instead, the two are complementary and mutually reinforcing, with the need for prosecutions spurring rebuilding of infrastructure and other basic elements of a functioning justice system. This
has not, of course, yielded either instant or consistent results. It does,
however, allow atrocity trials to function as part of an engine of reform
and reconstruction.
3. Conclusions Concerning Crucial Features
The transnational networks that exist in the Congo seem to serve
functions and operate in some ways like the transnational networks that
others have observed in the contexts of human rights law and international criminal law. However, the post-conflict justice networks in the
Congo have certain crucial characteristics that differ from these other
transnational networks, like the quick movement of personnel. They
also differ in important ways from alternative approaches to international-national interactions, such as international and hybrid courts.
Unlike international courts that seize control or peer-to-peer hybrid
courts that blur lines of authority and control, in the Congo we see hybrid legal processes that leave authority and control in domestic hands,
with the international community providing resources and support.
This quality may contribute to the eventual effectiveness of the hybrid
processes in rebuilding a functioning national judiciary.
Furthermore, the institutional structure of the international organizations that typically send people to conflict and post-conflict zones
ensures that some members of these transnational networks will be particularly well placed to bring information and skills quickly from one
such zone to another. These individuals also tend to be specialists in
post-conflict reconstruction and justice issues and to be relatively junior
as compared to the judges who are typically recruited for hybrid courts.
As such, the individuals that comprise these networks contribute to
what I call a “functional hybrid” process that builds upon the strong
points of its international and national aspects, for they are well suited
to take on the sort of supportive and facilitative role that transnational
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networks have played in the Congo. The importance of these individual
players and their individual experiences is magnified in a post-conflict
setting where national institutions and bureaucracies have typically
been destroyed, where national institutions like legislatures may not be
functioning well, and where more traditional conduits of legal information, like jurisprudence, may not reach their intended audience on
their own.
Conclusion
The transnational networks supporting atrocity trials in the Democratic Republic of the Congo offer a realistic model for the involvement of the international community in post-conflict justice. Rather
than seeking to assert control over atrocity trials and ensure that they
reach the right results by holding them at the international level or by
establishing special hybrid courts dominated by foreign judges, the international community may more profitably invest its resources in supporting and facilitating trials controlled by domestic judges in domestic
courts. Rather than looking solely to international courts and jurists to
convey international norms, transnational networks made up of members of the institutions on the ground in post-conflict settings— the
UN, NGOs, foreign embassies, and the local legal community—can do
so also, and often more effectively. These networks of frequently moving experts in post-conflict justice settings can quickly convey legal rules
and skills from one post-conflict setting to another.
The Congolese experience suggests two fruitful approaches to international influence in post-conflict countries: (1) expanding the use
of transnational networks rather than reliance on conventional mechanisms of influence such as publication of judicial decisions; and (2) the
use of carefully designed hybrid mechanisms and institutions, relying
on junior personnel and support activities rather than senior personnel
and primary control of institutions. It also suggests some aspects of international law that networks might promote. Supporting direct use by
courts of the Rome Statute and other international legal rules, if appropriate under the relevant constitutional system, may assist courts in
bypassing nonfunctioning legislatures. Transferring relevant foreign
and international jurisprudence into the domestic system and relevant
domestic jurisprudence into the international system could advance
post-conflict states’ participation in and benefit from transnational judicial dialogue concerning matters of post-conflict justice.
There is no doubt that national courts in conflict and postconflict states like the DRC are often deeply flawed institutions and
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that due process violations are a commonplace occurrence in these
venues. It is no wonder that many commentators have urged a retreat
to the international level as the best means of assuring that minimum
due process standards are met.319 This Article suggests some reasons
that it is worth reconsidering national courts as a venue for war crimes
trials. Among other reasons, in reality international and national
courts will be competing for cases only rarely, so that making a direct
comparison between the two as if there were actually a choice of venues is inapposite in most cases. Furthermore, there is not a necessary
connection between the focal point of a set of interests (local, national, or international) and the venue in which those interests can
best be served; international interests may best be served in national
venues or vice-versa. Fundamentally, I argue for context-specific approaches and contend that it is worth using transnational networks to
attempt to influence Congolese courts, rather than simply dismissing
them for their admittedly grave flaws.
Here, I would like to return to what I consider the most robust argument in favor of national courts as venues, contending that we
should shift our focus from the results of the immediate trials to more
long-term and holistic effects. From this perspective, national courts’
systemic weaknesses do not necessarily present an adequate reason for
rejecting them as venues for post-conflict justice. To the contrary, often,
though not always, the international community should invest its resources into corrupt, nonfunctioning, and otherwise problematic national systems. The international community has too long focused on
holding high profile individual trials that comply with rigorous due
process standards, on the laudable but unproven theory that these trials will promote post-conflict goals such as justice for victims, retribution, reconciliation, and deterrence. As Jane Stromseth and Mark
Drumbl have argued, the notion that procedurally pristine trials will
ensure public confidence in the impartiality of the proceedings and the
legitimacy of the results has not been borne out by the response to the
ICTY and the ICTR in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively.320 The expectation that such trials will achieve the loftier goals of
post-conflict justice, while appealing intellectually, is at best contextdependent. It is telling that the trend since seeing the negligible national and local impact of the ICTY and ICTR’s trials has been more
319 E.g., Heller, supra note 19, at 279; see also Drumbl, supra note 19, at 189–91 (suggesting criteria for “qualified deference” to national tribunals).
320 Drumbl, supra note 19, at 72, 130–31; Stromseth, supra note 3, at 258–80.
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and more toward looking to their legacy effect on the corresponding
national systems. In my view, this trend is a good one.
Indeed, I propose that we should turn the current valuation of
post-conflict justice goals on its head and should look mainly to longterm effects on the capabilities of national justice systems in assessing
how to invest international resources in post-conflict justice. In this, I
echo and build upon Jane Stromseth’s call to bridge the gap between
“transitional justice” and “rule of law reform” scholarship and “explore
systematically how accountability processes might, concretely, contribute to forward-looking rule of law reforms.”321
I do not pretend that the type of investment I propose is necessarily going to be effective in any given situation. Certainly, there are
good reasons to fear investing in systems as troubled as the Congo’s,
such as the potential for abuse of the legal system to oppress political
opponents or minority ethnic groups or to take personal revenge for
private grievances. Although the cases discussed in this Article seemed
to benefit from the introduction of international law, more recent
cases have reportedly been undermined by political interference.322
There is also reason to heed the warnings of the long literature on
legal transplants and to be nervous about the effects of international
influence upon national legal reform.
Nor is international support for and investment in atrocity trials
remotely sufficient to rebuild a national justice system.323 Rather, it is
one possible point of entry for international resources in a complex
and fraught process. I would argue, however, that it is a particularly useful point of entry in certain respects. Fundamentally, atrocity trials offer
a useful focal point for international attention. They are dramatic, of
limited duration, and have a definitive conclusion. They require specific inputs: attorneys, judges, courtrooms, police, witnesses, physical
evidence, relevant laws, and so on. This provides opportunities for investment in particular programs (training, building, proposing legislation, etc.) with particular end products that international donors and
the involved domestic and international actors can claim as successes of
their projects. Atrocity trials also provide identifiable short-term results
in what is an extremely long-term and uncertain process.
A functioning judicial system represents post-conflict justice’s potentially most valuable and lasting legacy. As I have argued in other
321 Stromseth, supra note 3, at 256.
322 Clifford, supra note 103; Feb. 19 E-mail, supra note 127.
323 See generally Stromseth et al., supra note 20.
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post-conflict contexts, a focus on a few high level criminal trials ignores
the numerous and wide-ranging legal problems that arise in postconflict contexts and require some means of resolution.324 Furthermore, legal systems operate to some extent as a means of conflict prevention as well as dispute resolution. Self-reinforcing problems of violence, self-help, and vigilantism often develop even in otherwise stable
countries in the absence of an effective judiciary.325 It is not so much
that reform of the judiciary is always an achievable goal, especially in
the short term, but that it is a necessary goal for the eventual stabilization and peaceful functioning of post-conflict societies. It is therefore
worth pursuing even if it is not immediately attainable.
Under what circumstances does investing in troubled national systems makes sense? I have a few thoughts drawn from the Congolese
context. When the failed legal system is contributing to continued postconflict disorder, investing in the national system is crucial. In the
Congo, there is widespread impunity for crimes of all sorts, including
the atrocities of which the defendants in the cases highlighted in this
Article were convicted. Violence is rampant, and there are no legal
consequences. Under these circumstances, re-establishing legal order is
critical. Also, it is important to note that those tried in the domestic
cases discussed here were the immediate perpetrators. If not arrested
and tried, the accused would presumably still be active soliders or militia members in the conflict ongoing in eastern Congo. Thus, these trials do not concern solely justice for past crimes but deterrence in the
most direct sense: preventing additional crimes by these very perpetrators as well as the vigilantism that arises in the absence of any hope of
justice.
On the other hand, investing in national systems would not be appropriate when the level of political interference in trials means that
not only are the influential and powerful protected from prosecution,
but the legal system is consistently deployed by the powerful against the
innocent to serve their purposes, without hope of recourse. This is deliberately a very high threshold. All legal systems are susceptible of illicit influence, and post-conflict legal systems are often deeply susceptible of it. To require a non-corrupt system would be to go back to square

324 Baylis, supra note 28, at 3–4.
325 Elena A. Baylis, Beyond Rights: Legal Process and Ethnic Conflicts, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L.
529, 540–41, 550 (2004); Widner, supra note 13, at 70.
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one. Nevertheless, some “self-limitation on capriciousness”326 is necessary lest the international community find itself in support of a legal
vendetta.
These represent the extreme ends of the possible range of pros
and cons of investing in national systems—on the one hand, the risk
of total disorder if there is no legal system in place, and on the other,
the risk of the legal system serving as merely a tool of oppression.
There are of course far more nuanced assessments to be done of the
factors that indicate potential for the success of such investments and
also of the kinds of involvement that might be most fruitful.
But regardless of whether the international community should
promote national trials and invest in national courts, the fact is that it is
happening. National trials are taking place, and transnational networks
are conveying international law and international legal practice to national courts. Amongst the information being transferred are the
judgments of international courts. Thus, the anxiety of supporters of
international criminal courts over their failed domestic role is perhaps
overblown. International criminal courts have undoubtedly been more
important thus far for the international community than for the national and sub-national communities directly affected by atrocities. By
their institutional structure and design, international courts and even
hybrid courts are probably not the best mechanisms for conveying international law to chaotic post-conflict settings. But they probably
shouldn’t try to be. Rather than trying to develop a model of the ideal
court—one that can hold procedurally pristine trials in The Hague that
are deeply meaningful to rape survivors in Ituri—we should model and
build from the messy, incomplete, but nonetheless very real justice
mechanisms that are actually functioning in post-conflict settings.

326 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 159, at 409 (“‘[S]elf-limitation’ on capriciousness is to be taken as the minimum degree of order that begins to cover the nakedness of
control with a cloak of authority.”).

